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Abstract
This thesis in applied microeconomics is composed of three chapters,
each one addressing a different question.
The first chapter, “Sequential distribution in the presence of Piracy”,
shows how firms can exploit the timing of the release of digital content
as a way to mitigate the effects of piracy, in a world where some piracy
is unavoidable. We develop an analytical model where a monopolist pro-
duces a particular good, and it can choose the time at which its product
is available to consumers. On top of deciding on prices, the monopo-
list also chooses the share of the product it releases at each period. In
the absence of piracy, firm’s profits are independent of the way in which
content is released. However, when piracy is a real threat, the firm can
soften its effect by strategically selecting the share of the product offered
in each period, changing consumers’ valuation and making piracy less
attractive from their perspective. The monopolist benefits from releas-
ing content in two different periods in an asymmetric way which find
analogies in real life examples such as the market of specialised software
tools or of TV shows.
The second chapter, “Shill bidding in common value auctions”, presents
the effects of a particular cheating environment in common value auc-
tions. Shill bidding consists of placing anonymous bids on the seller’s
behalf to artificially drive up the prices of the auctioned item. We build
a simple model to understand the incentives a seller has to shill bid in an
English common value auction where the bidders’ private information is
drawn from a discrete distribution. We show how the discreteness affects
the seller’s ex-ante expected gain of shill bidding, and we also show how
the seller updates his shill bid based on the new information he receives
as the auction goes on. We find that if the number of signals is low, the
seller might be better off refraining from participating even when bidders
are fully myopic. Moreover, for any number of signals in the auction, if
the number of participants is sufficiently high, the shill bidding strategy
always deteriorates the seller’s expected profits.
The third chapter, “Physician convenience and cesarean section deliv-
ery”, is co-authored with Shagun Khare and Alan Acosta. This paper
analyses the causes that might explain the high rate of cesarean section
in Buenos Aires, Argentina, that far exceeds the World Health Organiza-
tion recommendation. The supplier-induced demand hypothesis, which
predicts more c-section deliveries than otherwise medically needed, might
be the reason for this disparity. In this paper, using a survey of pregnant
women in Buenos Aires, we study one aspect of the physician’s incentives
to induce demand: convenience. We look at whether a woman’s chance
of getting a c-section depends on the period of delivery, i.e. whether it
is a working day or not. Setting aside scheduled c-sections, we find that
convenience matters, but only in private hospitals. We also find that
women who state that they prefer c-sections over natural births have a
higher chance of having a c-section in private hospitals. While physicians’
convenience and mothers’ preferences do matter, our research finds that
the institutional environment plays a defining role in how much these
matters.
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Chapter 1
Sequential Distribution in the
Presence of Piracy
1.1 Introduction
The rise of Internet access along with the growth of digital content has enabled
digital piracy to flourish around the world. If there is no “positive effect” on the
demand side (e.g., discovering the unknown, accessing the inaccessible, sampling or
network effects), the effect of piracy on firms that produce the original products is
unambiguous: piracy reduces its sales and also makes it harder to extract revenue
from their remaining consumers (Johnson, 1985; Goldman, 2010; Smirke, 2014).1
This fierce competition inevitably erodes industry profits, threatening production
and innovation (Novos and Waldman, 1984; Strauss, 2013; Raustiala and Springman,
2012).
The content and software industry reacted to this threat in several ways, some
of them more successful than others. Initially, content producer firms lobbied gov-
ernments to use all their means to stop piracy.2 It seemed reasonable to think that
the only way to compete with piracy was by making the pirated version harder to
find, to make it less attractive from consumers’ perspective, and more legally risky
to consume. However, these measures proved to take time to implement and most
of them have been to be neither easy to enforce nor very efficient. Stopping internet
piracy has been compared with “playing the game of Whac-A-Mole: hit one, and
1Total revenue from U.S. music sales and licensing plunged to $6.3 billion in 2009, according to
Forrester Research. In 1999, that revenue figure topped $14.6 billion (Goldman, 2010).
2An example of this is the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), an attempt of the creative industries
to convince American legislators to get involved in the legal campaign. The act failed because of
the resistance from technology companies and Internet activists.
1
quickly countless others appear... and the mallet is heavy and slow.”3
Thus, creators and producers of digital content had to adapt to a new more
competitive world where piracy constrained their business opportunities. On top
of reacting with prices, innovation in the way they designed and marketed their
content seems to have been a successful strategy in a world where some piracy is
unavoidable. As Steve Jobs mentioned in the Rolling Stone’s 2003 Interview “we’re
never going to stop the illegal downloading services, but our message is: let’s compete
and win.”4
This paper focuses on the later point and explores how firms can exploit the
timing of the release of content as a way to mitigate the effects of piracy. We
develop an analytical model where a monopolist produces a particular good, and it
can choose the time at which its product becomes available to consumers. Therefore,
in addition to prices, the monopolist also chooses the share of the product it releases
at each of two different periods.
In the absence of piracy, the extent to which the product is made available in
each period does not affect the firm’s profit. The monopolist can either release
everything at the beginning, everything at the end, or any combination thereof,
without any effect on total profit. Pricing is sufficient as an instrument to extract
the monopoly rent from consumers. Different proportions of the product in different
periods change optimal prices proportionally, keeping optimal quantities and the
price per share unchanged, which results in the same aggregate monopoly profit
whatever the release strategy chosen.
In the presence of piracy, the competitive environment changes and the standard
monopoly profit is no longer attainable. Interestingly, as opposed to the case without
piracy, profit maximization constrained to this alternative competitive environment
cannot be attained by setting only the most convenient prices. Even when the copy
is offered for free, piracy is not costless for consumers and the way the monopolist
decides to release its product plays a key role in profit maximization.
Consistently with the way demand for pirated products has been modelled in the
literature (Bae and Choi, 2006; Belleflamme and Peitz, 2014; Piolatto and Schuett,
2012), in our model consumers who pirate the good incur a cost of piracy that is
made of two parts. First, a fix component called the “reproduction cost” that refers
to the cost in time and in cognitive effort that consumers face when searching online.
Second, a variable component called “degradation cost” that refers to a copy being
of lower quality than the original product. Then, pricing in the presence of piracy
3The New York Times, “Internet Pirates Will Always Win". Aug. 4, 2012.
4The Rolling Stone, “Steve Jobs: Rolling Stone’s 2003 Interview”. Dec. 25, 2003.
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is the same as pricing against another firm that offers a product of degraded quality
at a price equal to the reproduction cost.
The way consumers value pirated products introduces a trade-off as to the op-
timal release strategy of the monopolist. On the one hand, the monopolist has
an incentive to divide its product and not to offer it “all-at-once”. By offering its
product in more than one period, the monopolist takes advantage of the positive
reproduction cost that forces consumers to pay twice for the same pirated product.
Then, piracy becomes costlier and, other things equal, more consumers are willing
to buy the original product. This is a consequence of the reproduction cost of piracy,
which allows for the possibility of piracy deterrence in one period.
On the other hand, the degradation cost has the effect of increasing the demand
for the original product more than proportionally to the demand of the pirated
version as more content is released altogether. This result is explained by the fact
that an increment in the share the firm offers in a given period increases the net
utility that consumers get from consuming the original product more than what
they get from the pirated version. As a consequence, a higher share offered by the
firm increases the monopolist’s market power.
In equilibrium, the monopolist benefits from releasing content in an asymmetric
way across periods. By releasing only a small amount of value in one period, the
firm is allowed to deter piracy, relying on that it would be worthless for consumers
to pay a reproduction piracy cost for a small amount of value. In the other period
(always the first one where there is a discount factor), the firm accommodates piracy
and charges a price which is constrained by the opportunity costs of piracy.
The result of this model is aligned with the evidence found in the market of
movies and TV shows broadcast, the music industry and software. Since the rise of
piracy, we observe how the most successful firms were those who gave non-pecuniary
strategies a key role in competing. In particular, when there is a discount factor,
our model predicts that most of the content is released at once, and the remaining
fraction, not worth copying, is released later. This strategy has many analogies
in real life examples. For instance, specialised software tools (like Stata, Matlab,
or Mathematica) commercialise a functional base version, which can be extended
with paid add-ons.5 The market for TV shows has implemented similar policies
(Wallenstein, 2011; Lynch, 2015; Adalian, 2015), like making shorter seasons for
their most famous and most pirated shows (Game of Thrones, Breaking Bad, Mad
5We consider technical software as a good example because it abstracts from complexities from
two-sided markets or network effects, as we do in our model.
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Men, Archer, etc.)6 whose creators and producers, in turn, have shown less concern
about the effects of piracy.7 Also, the music industry agrees that making one ‘long-
playing album’ (or ‘LP’) a year is no longer enough and the shorter ‘extended play’
sibling (or ‘EP’), on the other hand, makes much more sense and is very much alive
(Rodriguez, 2015; Radar Music Videos, 2013).
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we survey the relevant liter-
ature. In Section 3 we present a formal model and the monopolist’s and consumers’
strategies. In Section 4 we focus on optimal pricing and product design without
piracy as the benchmark case. In Section 5 we find the optimal pricing with piracy
as a function of the share of the product released in each period. In Section 6, we
focus on product design and the equilibrium of the game. Finally, in Section 7, we
introduce a discount factor and we show it affect our findings.
1.2 Literature Review
A well-developed literature analyses the consequences of piracy on firms’ profitabil-
ity. Similar to our model, when there is no positive effects from the demand side,
Johnson (1985) shows that the pirated copy limits the monopoly power of the origi-
nal supplier, which results in a more competitive market of the good, even when they
are differentiated (copies are inferior to originals, but they are also cheaper). The
new market structure inevitably reduces monopoly profit if piracy is a real threat,
either because the firm reduces its price to avoid the pirated copy being in the
market (the firm “deters” piracy), or because the firm responds in such a way that
piracy is present in the market (the firm “accommodates” piracy). If piracy is not a
real threat, the monopoly is not subject to any restriction and its monopoly profit
remain unchanged (piracy is “blockaded”). Also, Belleflamme and Peitz (2014), and
Bae and Choi (2006) get the same results considering a model of vertical product
differentiation where a single-product monopolist sells to a continuum of heteroge-
neous consumers. In this setup, the firm’s profits also decrease with the availability
of digital copies.
In contrast with the negative results of copying drawn from these basic models,
there is also a more favorable view of piracy on the industry profit. In cases where the
consumption of the good presents externalities, not enforcing copyright protection
6Breaking Bad and Mad Men decided to split their last season in two different years. The same
is planned for Game of Thrones.
7The creator of Breaking Bad says piracy “helped” the show to become popular and increase
“brand awareness” (Izundu, 2013). Also, HBO has said that “Game of Thrones” piracy is a com-
pliment (Hibberd, 2013).
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may be privately beneficial even without indirect appropriation. Takeyama (2003)
shows that in the presence of network externalities, where consumers’ willingness to
pay increase in the number of users, full enforcement of copyright protection may
involve the monopolist selling to all consumers getting lower profits than in the case
of no enforcement. Gayer and Shy (2003) find a similar result. Considering a model
of horizontal differentiation between the original and the copy, in the presence of
strong network effects, the monopolist is better off with the availability of copies.
Piracy may also be beneficial for a monopolist if it provides information to con-
sumers when the product requires some form of experimentation. Peitz and Wael-
broeck (2006) show that the negative effect on sales that results for the existence
of the pirated copy may be overcompensated by a positive effect due to sampling
in a multiproduct environment. Consumers are willing to pay for the product after
sampling because the match between product characteristics and buyers’ tastes is
improved. In the same line of research, Takeyama (2003) analyses how copies that
provide information on the quality of a product can solve an adverse selection in
models of asymmetric information. Also, Zhang (2002) considers the role of pro-
motion costs and copying in artistic markets. With piracy, the niche artists can
distribute their songs using a P2P technology better finding their audiences, while
in the world without copies the distribution technology favours artists with a large
audience (or stars).
Although these results are important, they focus on the potential beneficial ef-
fects of piracy for producers. Our paper deals with the role of the firm to find and
implement alternative business models to avoid negative effects of end-user copying
when demand is constant.
The closest paper to ours in terms of reshape of content with constant demand
is Alvisi et al. (2002) who analyse the case of versioning. In the absence of piracy,
the monopolist has no incentive to differentiate its products. However, with piracy
the monopolist might instead produce more than one quality, so that differentiation
arises as the optimal strategy: one version for a buyer with a high willingness to
pay and a second version (a downgraded version) for a buyer with a low willingness
to pay. Similar results over quality were found by Cho and Ahn (2010) who show
that the presence of piracy induces the firm to choose a lower level of quality of the
former and a higher level of quality of the latter relative to decisions made in the
absence of piracy.
Our contribution to this literature is that we also tackle the piracy issue from the
firm’s product design decision but from a novel perspective. We do this by focusing
on the releasing strategy of a particular product, when there is no beneficial effect
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from piracy. On top of the pricing decision, the monopolist might reduce the negative
effect of piracy on profit by changing the timing at which its product available to
consumers.
1.3 The Model
Consider a two-period model in which consumers arrive at the beginning of the
first period only. The monopolist produces a good with a certain quality and it is
able to decide which share of the product is available to consumers in every period,
0 ≤ γt ≤ 1, and γ1 + γ2 = 1. The firm has the option to release everything at
the beginning (γ1 = 1), or everything at end (γ2 = 1), or any combination thereof
(0 < γt < 1). In addition to that, the monopolist also makes the decision on prices
at the beginning of the game. Let p1 and p2 denote the prices of the product in
period one and two, respectively, with production being costless.8
As for the demand side, in each period there is a continuum of consumers of mass
1 whose valuation is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. Consumers differ
in their valuation of the good, θi, which is private information (the monopolist only
knows their distribution). Consumers get different utility depending on the share
of the product they consume in each period. They get γtθi consuming the original
product in period t. Consumers can obtain the product in two different ways. They
can either purchase the good or, alternatively, they can download a pirated copy
(when available). In either period, they can always refrain from consuming the good
and they can only consume the product offered by the monopolist at that time. 9
When piracy is available, consumers have the option to get a pirated copy at
a cost d,10 and the product they get is of lower quality, βγtθi, where 0 < β < 1.
Following Bae and Choi’s terminology, d is the “reproduction cost” of piracy, and
(1− β) is the “degradation cost” of piracy.11 Thus, consumers are heterogeneous
in terms of the valuation of the quality differential between original and copy, and
homogeneous in terms of the piracy cost. We assume that consumers are aware that
they are consuming an illegal good when they download it or get the copy.
8The zero-marginal-cost assumption merely facilitates the analysis, what is crucial is that the
marginal cost of originals does not exceed the marginal cost of copies, which is a reasonable
assumption for digital goods.
9We are disregarding the possibility that a consumer at the second period consumes the good
offered in the first one (or vice-versa).
10This is the same for all consumers and it could reflect the cost of searching for a pirated copy,
or the expected cost of downloading a malware, etc.
11This is a common assumption in the literature. The pirated copy is seen as imperfect substi-
tutes for the original digital product that provides users with a higher level of quality or services.
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1.3.1 Consumers’ choice





γtθ − pt ≡ uto if buys the original
βγtθ − d ≡ utp if gets the copy (when it is available)
0 if refrain from consuming
As we mentioned before, the only heterogeneity among consumers is given by θ.
Notice that if we let g = d + (1− β) γtθ, then utp = γtθ − g, where g is interpreted
as the gross pirate cost.
When piracy does not exist, we define the indifferent consumer, θmt , as the one
that gets the same utility when it buys than when it does not buy the good. Formally





Then, all consumers with θ ≥ θmt ≥ 0 buy the original, and the other ones stay out
of the market.
Similarly, when pirated copy is available, we call θpt the consumer who is in-
different between buying the good and getting the copy in period t. Formally,
γtθ
p
t − pt = βγtθ
p





and all consumers with θ ≥ θpt ≥ 0 buy the product in period t, conditional on
θpt being lower than 1. In addition to θ
p
t , we call θ̃t the consumer who is indifferent
between getting the copy and refraining from consuming the good. Formally, βγtθ̃t−





Consumers are willing to buy the copy if θ > θ̃t ≥ 0 and θ < θ
p
t . Finally, consumers
refrain from consuming the good if βγtθ − d < 0 and γtθ − p < 0.
Ex-ante, we don’t know the relationship between θ̃t and θ
p
t . Whenever θ̃t < θ
p
t ,
there will be three different types of consumers: those who buy the original, those
who pirate the good, and those who don’t consume the good at all. On the contrary,
if θ̃t > θ
p
t , then no consumer finds optimal to get the pirated copy and consumers
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either buy the good or refrain from consuming it. It is the case when the price of
the original is sufficiently low relatively to the cost of getting the pirated copy.
Whenever θ̃t > θ
p
t , consumers’ valuations in period t are not affected neither by
the values of pj nor γj, when j 6= t, except for the fact that a change in γj changes
the value of γt (and of prices in both periods accordingly).12 In other words, there
is not a strategic decision from the consumers perspective between periods, their
decision of consuming in period t only depends on the values of γ and p in period t.
1.3.2 Monopolist’s choice
The monopolist’s objective is to maximize total profit which are given by the sum
of the profits of the two periods,13
Π = p1q1 + p2q2 (1.4)
The demand, qt, depends on the existence or the non-existence of piracy. When
the firm does not face any competition we know that there is only one indifferent
consumer between buying and not consuming the good. Then, all consumers with
a valuation higher than that indifferent consumer will decide to buy the good from
the monopolist. On the contrary, those consumers with a private valuation lower
that one of the indifferent consumer will refrain from buying the good given that
their net utility is negative. This indifferent consumer is the one with the valuation
θmt , then demand is given by qt = (1− θ
m
t ) ≡ q
m
t .
When the pirated copy is available, the indifferent consumer between buying
and pirating the good is the one that determines the demand. The valuation of the
indifferent consumer is θt, and all consumers with a valuation higher than θt decide
to buy the original good. Then, demand is given by qt = (1− θt) ≡ qot .
In both cases, the interaction between the two periods is given by γt, which
shows that increasing the share of the good in any period increases demand and
profits in that period but it unambiguously decreases the willingness to pay and
profits in the other one (other things equal). When piracy is possible, a change in
γt affects the demand of the original product in a different way under the existence
or the non-existence of piracy. The difference is explained by the fact that, in the
presence of piracy, the share of the product released in each period affects not only
the consumers’ willingness to pay for the original product but also the consumers’
12Given our assumption that γ1 + γ2 = 1
13There is not discount factor.
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willingness to get the pirated copy. Then, the optimal choice of γt gives to the
monopolist one more instrument to fight against piracy.14
1.4 Optimal pricing and product design without piracy:
a benchmark case
As a benchmark case, we consider a situation where piracy does not exist, and the
consumers’ only choice is whether to purchase or not.
From the previous section, we know that all consumers with θ ≥ θmt buy the
product in period t, conditional on θmt being higher than zero and lower than one.
Then, the monopolist’s demand in period t is given by qmt = 1 − θ
m
t . Consumers’
net utility in period t depends exclusively on their valuation and prices in period
t.15 Their optimal strategy is independent between periods but it is not the case for











, for all t = 1, 2.
Then, on top of prices, the monopolist has to choose the share of the product it
offers in each period.
Lemma 1.1. When piracy does not exist in the market, the monopolist’s total profit
is independent of the share of the product offered in each period.















both being independent on the value of γ chosen.
14We show how changes in γ modify the monopolist’s profit function in Section 1.6
15Remember that each consumer decides whether to buy or not in the second period whatever
they did in the first period, and viceversa.
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This result is quite intuitive.16 When there is no competition in the market,
optimal monopoly quantities remain the same whatever γt chosen. Prices change
linearly with γt: a rise in γ2 will increase prices in the second period in the same
magnitude as it decreases in the first period. However, the price per share (defined
as the price over the share offered in that period) remains constant. As a result,
monopoly profit is independent on γt, which makes the monopolist indifferent about
which share distribution of the product it offers in each period.
1.5 Optimal pricing with piracy
We now introduce the possibility that consumers get a pirated copy of the original
good. By getting the pirated copy, consumers save the price of the original but they
face another additional cost. Recalling the definition of gross pirate cost
gt = d+ (1− β) γtθ (1.9)
we observe that piracy entails two types of costs. The first term is the "reproduction
cost" (d), that is the cost of getting the pirated copy, and it is the same for all
consumers and for any t.17 The second term is the cost associated with "quality
degradation" (1 − β) because the copy is not a perfect substitute for the original.
In our model, consumers are homogeneous regarding the first type of cost, but
they are heterogeneous concerning the second one. The monopolist can modify the
degradation cost by changing γt, which means that the optimal choice of γt does
affect not only the valuation of the good but also the cost of getting the pirated
copy. An increment in the value of γt increases consumers’ valuation for both, the
original good and the pirated copy. However, the increase in consumers’ valuation
for the latest is lower than the one for the original good, due to the degradation
cost. The change in γt does not affect the reproduction cost.
The fact that the monopolist can modify the gross cost of piracy through γt
plays a major role in this model given that the monopolist’s strategy influences the
existence of piracy not only through prices but also through the share of the product
offered in each period.
There is a case in which piracy, even when it is technically feasible, is not a
real threat for the monopolist given that the pirated copy is not attractive to any
consumer. In this case, and the monopolist is not constraint to offer the monopoly
quantity at the monopoly price. This condition arises when the structural barriers
16The monopolist produces a scalable product.
17It refers to the cost in time and in cognitive effort that consumers face when searching online.
10
that limit competition (poor quality of the copy or high cost of getting the pirated
version) are high in relation to the value consumers get from the pirated copy. Then
piracy is said to be blockaded, even when it might require the intervention of the
monopolist (through γt).
Lemma 1.2. For values of γt sufficiently low, γt <
2d
β
, piracy is blockaded in the
market at period t.
Proof. In the absence of piracy, and from Section 1.4, we know that monopoly





. Then, whenever θ̃t > 12 , piracy is blockaded
in the market. Recalling that 0 ≤ γt ≤ 1, and using Equation (1.3), we get the
result.
Lemma 1.2 tell us that there is always a place for the monopolist to blockade
piracy at period t. When piracy is blockaded, price and quantity are the ones
obtained in Section 1.4. Notice that if the relative cost of piracy, d/β, is sufficiently
high, piracy is blockaded without the intervention of the monopolist. Nevertheless,
to have a meaningful analysis of piracy, we restrict our attention to the parameter





The novelty in this model is that the monopolist can limit competition at period
t using two different instruments, pt and γt. The use of a limit price is well known
in the literature, and it does not present any additional flavour in our model: even
when it is a two-period model, the pricing decision at time t only depends on the
parameters at time t. However, the decision on γt affects the market in period j
(where j 6= t), given that a higher share of the product offered today necessarily
means a lower share tomorrow, that affects demand and prices in both periods.
For the sake of a better understanding of the model, we will first study the
monopolist’s best response under the piracy regime and the limit pricing regime,
keeping γt fixed. We will find the similarities with other static models of piracy in
the literature where the only variable the monopolist can affect is the price. Then,
we focus on the optimal product design and the equilibrium of the game.
1.5.1 Limit pricing regime
As we mentioned above, we first study the monopolist’s pricing decision in each
period, keeping the share of the product fixed. In this case, the monopolist decides
to set a price such that the pirated copy is not attractive for any consumer. In
18Later, in Section 1.6, we use a stronger assumption on d
β
to make piracy exists in at least one
period.
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this framework, consumers either buy the original or refrain from consuming the
good. The price that limits piracy is the one that satisfies the condition θpt = θ̃t (see





When the monopolist sets pt = plt, demand

















We can observe that the limit price is independent of γt, but quantities are not.
A higher γt results in a higher demand and higher profit at period t. However, at
the other period, demand and profit are necessarily lower.




1.5.2 Piracy regime and price setting
The second alternative for the monopolist is to set a price under which piracy is
attractive for some consumers (θ̃t < θ
p
t ). Then, conditional on the existence of
copies, the demand for originals is qot = 1 − θ
p























The response of the optimal price to a change in γt is the expected one. A
higher value of γt increases demand and it affects the optimal price positively. A





surprising result is the one that comes from optimal quantities: a higher demand
reduces the supply of originals. The intuition from this result can be found in the
monopolist’s pricing behaviour. If there were no price change, a rise in γt would
lead to some consumers switching from the pirated copy to the original good, which
unambiguously increases monopoly profit. However, the monopolist’s best strategy
is to increase the optimal price which not only eliminates the incentives to switch
from the pirated copy to the original good but it also diminishes the base of buyers.
Figure 1.2: Consumers’ choice under piracy regime, pot =
1
2
(d+ γt (1− β)) > p
l
t.
Given the assumptions on the relative cost of piracy, piracy cannot be fully
deterred (piracy cannot be deterred in both periods). Then, the decision of the
monopolist is to either accommodate piracy in both periods or deter piracy in one
of them. In the next section, we show that partial deterrence is the regime that
prevails in equilibrium.
1.6 Product design and equilibrium
In this section, we determine the monopolist’s best response function when it chooses
the product design, i.e. when it can decide the share of the product it offers in
each period, γt. From the previous section, we have optimal prices and quantities











There are different solutions to be evaluated given that piracy might be deterred
at period t either using pt or γt. From our results in the previous section, we know
that a rise in γt increases consumers’ willingness to pay in period t which makes the
monopolist better off in that period, but it reduces consumers’ willingness to pay and
monopoly profit in the other one. When the monopolist does not face competition,
this trade-off does not play any role on monopoly profit (Lemma 1.1). However,
in the presence of piracy, it does play a role because a change in γt modifies both,
13
consumers’ willingness to pay for the original product and consumers’ willingness to
get the pirated copy. In other words, the monopolist can limit the effects of piracy
by only changing γt, when prices remain unchanged.
With the aim to focus on the monopolist’s decision over γt, we need to restrict
the parameters of the model that can affect by themselves the optimal solution.
As we showed in the previous section, the parameter that can affect by itself the
monopolist’s optimal strategy is the relative cost of piracy, d
β
.
Assumption 1.1. The relative cost of piracy is lower than r ≡ (1−β)
2(2−β)
to ensure
that piracy always exists in, at least, one of the periods.
This assumption ensures that whatever the values of γt, the monopolist can never
get entirely rid of piracy in both periods. Then, the decision of the monopolist is
either to accommodate piracy in both periods or to deter piracy in one of them.
When d
β
is sufficiently close to r, the only level of γt at which piracy is present
in both markets is at γt = 12 .
20 For example, a small rise in γ2, makes piracy be still
present in period two but completely disappeared in period one. The monopolist
would be deterring piracy in the first period not only using prices but also using γ1.
Recalling the effect of a change in γt, when the value of the product decreases, the
original is relatively more attractive than the pirated copy that, in turn, it becomes
relatively more expensive than originals.
As d
β
decreases, it is harder for the monopolist to deter piracy using γt given
that, when piracy is cheap, the monopolist has to be much more aggressive in the
use of γt to make originals more attractive than pirated copies. Then, we can define
the limits on γt under which piracy is present in both periods.






, where γLt =








Proof. The monopolist’s and consumers’ optimal strategies are symmetric in both
periods. Assumption 1.1 tells us that piracy arises equally in both periods, which
means that θ̃t ≤ θ
p
t for t = 1, 2. We also know that higher values of γt reduce θ
p
t and
increases θ̃t, which in turn bring them closer to each other. Then, piracy arises in










20Assumption 1.1 can be interpreted as the maximum level of the relative cost of piracy that
supports piracy simultaneously in both markets.
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exist in both periods.
The interval in which piracy is present in both periods is wider as d/β decreases,
reflecting that deterrence requires more asymmetry in the shares offered when piracy
is relatively cheap.21
The last result defines two possible equilibrium outputs: either the monopolist
chooses γt in this interval, or either it chooses γt out of it. In the first case, the mo-
nopolist accommodates piracy in both periods. In the second one, piracy is deterred
in one period and accommodated in the other one. Given that the monopolist’s
profit function changes for different intervals of γt,22 we have to deal with both sce-
narios separately. We proceed as follows. First, we present the monopolist’s profit






, that is, the
monopolist offers almost similar shares of the product in both periods. Second, we
proceed to find the monopolist’s profit function and its optimal decision on γt, con-
ditional on γt being out of this range, that is, the monopolist offers the total product
in two quite asymmetric parts. Finally, we compare both solutions and we get the
equilibrium of this game.
1.6.1 Accommodating piracy
We start our analysis by showing the monopolist’s best strategy when it accommo-







case, monopoly prices and quantities in both periods are given by Equations (1.14)
































t=1 γt = 1. The solution to this problem is presented in Proposition 1.1.
21However, we will see next that high asymmetry might result in different optimal strategies for
the monopolist.
22This are the intervals delimited by corner solution.
15
Proposition 1.1. The monopolist’s optimal strategy is to choose either the mini-












Proof. Replacing γj = 1− γt, the function to maximizes is reduced to
ΠI ≡ 1
2























4γ2t (1− β)(1− γt)
2
= 0 (1.19)
which gives us a critical point at γt = γj = 12 . Then, differentiating Π
I twice with













given the value of the parameters in our model.















If the monopolists wanted to accommodate piracy in both periods, he could offer
the original product in two equal shares or in different shares with small asymmetries.
As we discussed in Lemma 1.3, the degree of asymmetries under which piracy exists
in both periods depends on the relative cost of piracy. Nevertheless, Proposition 1.1
tells us that, conditional on accommodating piracy in both periods, the worst thing
the monopolist can do is to offer a product divided into two equal shares.
The intuition of this result is the following. Let’s assume that the monopolist
starts offering the product in equal shares, γ1 = γ2. If it decides to increase γ2





several things happen. First, a higher value of γ2 increases
consumers’ valuation in the second period which induces more consumers to enter
the market. However, these consumers are the ones with the lowest valuation who
find profitable to consume the pirated version but not the original one. Second,
at the same price, some consumers switch from the pirated copy to the original
product. This switch is explained by the fact that the valuation of the original
product increases in the same proportion with γ2, but the valuation for the pirated
version increases in a lower proportion, (1− β). Other things equal, the monopolist
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is unambiguously better off in that period, even when he does not change its pricing
strategy.
Third, in response to higher demand, the monopolist might increase the price
to extract more surplus from those consumers who were already buying the original
product, in other words, increase the price just to maintain the same price per share
and base of consumers.23 If it were the case, total monopoly profit would not change
given that quantities are the same and the price per share in each period remains
constant. Nevertheless, there is an additional effect that says that the monopolist
can do better than that. A rise in γ2 makes demand in the second period more
inelastic (the opposite happen in period one). As a result, the monopolist has more
market power in the period where consumers’ valuation is the highest, which calls
the monopolist to increase the price even further, ending up with a higher price per
share and lower optimal quantities in the second period. The gains in the profit
in the second period more than offset the loss in the first one, and total monopoly
profit is unambiguously higher.
As a result, when facing piracy in both periods, the best action the monopolist
can take is to maximize total quantities, q1 + q2, which is attained by maximizing
the difference between consumers’ valuation in both periods. The monopolist’s total
profit is maximized when it maximizes market penetration (or minimize piracy) in
the first period which, simultaneously, skims off the cream in the second one.
1.6.2 Deterring piracy
Now, our aim is to find the monopolist’s best strategy when it chooses γt ≤ γLt or,






means that piracy is deterred in one of the two periods. We are going to differentiate
two types of deterrence, that depend on the value of γt, which result in two different
optimal strategies for the monopolist.
The first type of deterrence happens when, even when piracy is absent at period
t, it still conditions the monopolist’s behaviour (over prices or quantities). That is
the case when θ̃t < θmt , this is the case when γt is higher than γ
H
t , but it is not
too high. The second type of deterrence happens when, at period t, the valuation
of consumers and the monopoly price are so low that piracy does not condition the
monopolist anymore, that is the case when θmt < θ̃t that happens when γt is close
to one.
23 Exactly the opposite happens in the first period, where the reduction of γ1 reduces the total
size of the market, the monopolist’s demand, and the optimal price.
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We need to find the thresholds, γ̄tH and γ̄tL, under which these two types of
deterrence exist. Given the nature of our model, our solution is symmetric which






















We can now present the monopolist’s optimal strategies under the two types of
deterrence. For simplicity, we present our results for γ̄tL < γt < γLt and 0 ≤ γt ≤ γ̄t
L.
1.6.2.1 Conditional deterrence
We present the case where piracy is deterred at period t but still conditions the
monopolist’s behaviour (over prices or quantities). The monopolist offers a low
share of the product at period t (a high share in period j 6= t) which causes that
the pirated copy is no attractive in that period anymore (even when the price of
the original is low, demand is lower too). The monopolist set the limit pricing in




Lemma 1.4. At the value of γt where piracy starts being deterred, γt = γ
L
t , the
limit pricing, plt =
d
β
, is always lower than the monopoly price.
Proof. Given that pmt is decreasing in γt, we only need to show that p
l < pm1 when
γt = γ
L






. This is always true under the assumption that β < 1 and
d > 0.
This is a common result in the literature, in order to deter piracy, the monopolist
has to set a price lower than the monopoly price which means that market penetra-
tion of the original product is increased (qlt defined in Equation 1.11 is higher than




t < θ̃t but θ
p
t is an indifferent consumer that does not longer
exist because piracy is already deterred (see Equation 1.2). Then, there are two
possible things the monopolist can do, either it keeps pt = plt and reduces demand
according to the decrease in γt, or it keeps the same demand and reduces prices
accordingly.
18
Lemma 1.5. Whenever γ̄t
L < γt ≤ γ
L






Proof. From γt = γLt backwards, the monopolist can either keep the same price in
period t, pt = plt, and reduce demand such that q
l
t = 1 −
d
γtβ
, or it can maintain
its supply qt = 1 − dγLt β ≡ q
L





≡ pLt . Then,



















= Π(pLt ,qLt )
which is always true under the condition that γ̄tL < γt ≤ γLt .
When θpt < θ̃t <
1
2
, the monopolist can deter piracy in period t using two
different instruments, pt or γt. Lemma 1.5 shows that the monopolist’s best strategy
is to keep the same limit pricing as γt falls, provided that θ
p
t < θ̃t. This strategy
ends up reducing market penetration in both periods. This is the result of its
optimal deterring strategy, where the indifferent consumer between pirating and not
consuming the good is the one that determines the demand for the original product,
who is no sensitive to a price change.
Having defined the monopolist’s optimal deterrence strategy, we can now focus





. The monopolist’s profit function is
ΠII ≡ Π
γt∈(γ̄tL,γLt )





















and γt+γj = 1. The optimal γt is derive from maximizing Equation 1.22 with respect





and γt + γj = 1. The solution to this maximization
problem is presented in Proposition 1.2.





is given by γ∗∗t , that is interior and unique.
















(1− γt) (1− β)
)
. (1.23)

















that is a polynomial of degree 4. However, in the relevant interval the solution is
unique (root 2), given that neither of the other 3 solutions satisfy the restriction
γ̄t
L < γt < γ
L
t (root 1, γt < 0, root 3, γt >
1
2
, and root 4, γt > 1). Even when
the profit function is not concave for all the parameter values, we know that the
solution found, γ∗∗t , is a maximum because the profit function is strictly monotone












, which also tells us that the solution is interior.
As explained above, from the point where piracy starts being deterred in period
t (γt = γLt and backwards), the monopolist faces a more costly trade-off than in
the case of small asymmetries: it still continues skimming off the cream in period
j, but market penetration in period t is also reduced as γt decreases (Lemma 1.5).
Monopoly profit increases in period j 6= t at the expense of also reducing optimal
quantities in period t. In the beginning, the total effect on monopoly profit is
still positive, given that the gain in period j more than offset the loss in period
t. However, from γ∗∗t backwards, the gain obtained in the period with the higher
demand does not compensate the loss of consumers in the period where consumers’
willingness to pay is lower. At this point, there is nothing else the monopolist can
do to avoid losing market penetration in period t given that demand is independent
of prices.
1.6.2.2 Unconditional deterrence
It remains to find the optimal strategy for extreme values of γt, when the monopo-
list offers very different shares of its product in both periods, 0 ≤ γt ≤ γ̄tL. At the
extreme, it is the case where the monopolist offers “all-at-once” in one of the two pe-
riods. When γt = γ̄tL, the monopolist’s optimal quantities are equal to the monopoly











Lemma 1.6. Whenever 0 ≤ γt ≤ γ̄t





Proof. From γt = γ̄tL backwards, the monopolist can either maintain the same limit
price in the first period, pt = plt, which means reducing demand and the price per
share as γt decreases, qlt = 1 −
d
γtβ





the price per share, reducing prices accordingly, pmt =
γt
2
. Then, comparing both













= Π(pmt ,qmt )
which is always true under the condition that 0 ≤ γt ≤ γ̄tL.
As γt decreases, the monopolist’s optimal deterrence strategy is to supply the
monopoly quantity in the first period while reducing pt. This result is quite intuitive
and equivalent to the result we get in the simple monopoly case: any deviation from
the monopoly quantity makes the monopolist worse off. In contrast to what we found
in Lemma 1.5, that the optimal strategy to deter piracy meant reducing quantities
maintaining the limit price, here we find that the monopolist is better off doing the
opposite in period t. Then, the total profit is




















and γt + γj = 1.
Again, the optimal product design, γt, is given by maximizing Equation 1.25,
subject to 0 ≤ γt ≤ γ̄tL and and γt + γj = 1. The solution to this problem is
presented in Proposition 1.3.
Proposition 1.3. The monopolist’s optimal strategy is to choose the maximum level





, that is γ∗∗∗t = γ̄t
L.











(1− γt) (1− β)
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(1.26)























is γ∗∗∗t = γ̄t
L.
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monopolist faces a trade-off by setting γt < γ̄tL: it increases the profit in period
j 6= t at the expense of decreasing the profit in period t. However, as opposed to
what happen in that case, piracy is blockaded at period t. The loss of profits in
period t that results after decreasing γt is higher than the rise in profits generated
in period j, which means that the monopolist’s best strategy in that interval, is to
set the maximum value of γt, this is γ∗∗∗t = γ̄t
L.
Now, summing up the results presented in Propositions 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, we are
ready to present our main result.
Theorem 1.1. The monopolist’s optimal strategy is to release its product in two
shares of difference sizes which, in turn, results in deterring piracy in one of those
periods. The “all-at-once” releasing strategy is always the worst response.
Proof. Altogether, Equations 1.17, 1.22, and 1.25 determine the monopolist’s total
profit function that is symmetric in γt = 12 . When the difference in the size of the
shares is small, i.e. piracy is accommodated in both periods, the monopolist’s profit
function is convex and attains a minimum at γt = 12 , which says the the monopolist’s
optimal strategy is to maximize the difference in the size of the shares as much as
possible.
Next, with stronger asymmetries, we have two different cases. The first case is
when piracy is deterred but it still conditions the monopolist’s behaviour. Given
the symmetry of the game, we have two solutions given by γ∗∗t and (1− γ
∗∗
t ). The
second one is when the share the monopolist offers in one of the periods is so low
that piracy does not condition the monopolist behaviour anymore. In this case, the
best strategy for the monopolist is to offer the maximum possible share in the period
with the lowest demand, conditional on piracy being blockaded, to take advantage
of the positive fixed cost of piracy.
In order to show that γ∗∗t found in Proposition 1.2 is the solution of our game
when γt < 12 ,
24 we only need to show that our profit function is continuous in γt,













are true. In addition, ΠIIIγt=0 (and Π
III
γt=1) is the minimum value of the monopolist’s
total profit function because the monopolists does not use in his favour the possibility
of duplicating the fixed cost of piracy to consumers, which makes it worse off.
Theorem 1.1 says that even when the monopolist is unable to hinder piracy
increasing its cost (either by increasing the cost of getting the pirated copy, d, or
by decreasing the quality of the copy, β) it can better compete with it by changing
the timing at which it makes its product available to consumers. By doing this,
it can take advantage of the positive fixed cost of piracy, and its effect on the
demand elasticity, making competition harder to the pirated copy, which results in
piracy being deterred in one of the markets. Similarly to the findings of Bae and
Choi (2006), the extent to which originals are used can be complementary with the
extent of piracy, compared to our benchmark case. The intuition for this result can
be found in the monopolist’s pricing behaviour in response to the threat of piracy:
the price reduction not only eliminates the incentives to switch for the consumers
of the pirated copy to originals, but it also expands the base of total buyers which
results in higher total profit.
Figure 1.3: Monopolist’s total profit function for γt ∈ [0, 1]
Figure 1.3 shows the monopolist’s total profit function plotted for all the support
of γt (the profit function is a mirror image in γt = 12). As previously explained for
0 ≤ γt ≤
1
2
, we use the symmetry of our model by showing the behaviour of the
profit function from γt = 12 onwards. We can see that the profit function is first
increasing in γt, meaning that the rise in consumers’ valuation in period t more
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than offset their decrease in demand in period j 6= t. Then, as consumers’ valuation
and prices go up in period t, piracy becomes less attractive in period j where, at
current prices, all demand is supplied by the monopolist (γj = γLj and γt = γ
H
t ).
The monopolist’s best strategy is to maximizes market penetration (or minimize
piracy) in period j, that simultaneously skims off the cream in period t. From that
point onwards, an increase in γt reduces market penetration in the period j that,
at the same price, reduces even more the monopolist’s profit in period j. Then, the
monopolist’s continues increasing γt up to the point where its marginal benefit in
period t is equal to its marginal cost in period j (γt = 1− γ∗∗t ).
As opposed to our benchmark case (where piracy does not exist and γt does not
play any role on total profit), the way the monopolist decides to release its product
plays a key role in profit maximization. The monopolist has now a clear reason to
not offer “all-at-once”. Even when the copy is offered for free, piracy is not costless
for consumers and, by offering its product in more than one period, the monopolist
takes advantage of the positive reproduction cost that forces consumers to pay twice
for the same pirated product. Moreover, in equilibrium, the monopolist benefits from
releasing content in an asymmetric way across periods. By releasing only a small
amount of value in one period, the firm is allowed to deter piracy, relying on that
it would be worthless for consumers to pay a reproduction piracy cost for a small
amount of value. In the other period, the firm accommodates piracy and charges a
price which is constrained by the opportunity costs of piracy.
1.7 Extension: Discount Factor
We now show how the result of our model changes when we introduce a discount
factor. The monopolist’s maximization problem (Equation 1.16) changes to
max
γ1,γ2
Π = p1q1 + δp2q2 (1.28)
subject to
γ1 + γ2 = 1
δ ≤ 1
When δ is lower than one, the symmetry of our model does not hold anymore.
In fact, we show that there is a unique solution in which the share offered in the
first period is higher than in the second one. Moreover, the effect of the discount
factor could be strong enough to make the “all-at-once” option the monopolist’s best
strategy.
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Proposition 1.4. There exists a threshold, δ̃ ∈ [0, 1], such that as δ decreases, the
monopolist best strategy is to increase the share of the product offered in the first
period, whenever δ ≥ δ̃. Otherwise, when δ < δ̃, the monopolist’s optimal strategy
is to offer “all-at-once” in the first period.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In the interval δ ∈ [δ̃, 1] the monopolist maintains the same strategy: it accom-
modates piracy in the first period (where it offers the highest share), and deters
















Starting from an equilibrium point, a decrease in δ in the interval [δ̃, 1], erodes
monopolist’s profit in the second period. The monopolist’s best response is to offer
a higher share of the product in the first period to compensate the loss in profits in
the second one, which means that γ∗∗2 is reduced.
When δ = δ̃, the monopolist is indifferent about releasing “all-at-once” in the
first period than the positive amount γ̃2 in the second one (defined in the Appendix






Then, γ̃2 can be interpreted as a “fixed cost” for the monopolist: any value of γ2
chosen between zero and γ̃2 is never a best response. There is a minimum share that
needs to be released in the second period to make this strategy profitable from the
monopolist perspective. Even when it can make use of his ability to duplicate the
reproduction cost to consumers by releasing a positive share in the second period,
the profits it gets from doing that might not compensate the loss in profits in the
first period if the discount factor is sufficiently low.
In comparison with our benchmark case, when piracy exists in the market the
interaction between the first and the second period is also different when δ < 1.
When piracy is not an issue, any value of δ lower than one, induces the monopolist
to offer “all-at-once” (that is the weakly dominant strategy ∀δ). There is no gain
of postponing content to the second period. However, when piracy is a real threat,
the strategy of releasing everything at the beginning is optimal only if the discount
factor is sufficiently low, δ < δ̃. For higher values of δ, δ > δ̃, the monopolist refrains
from doing so, given that its best strategy is to postpone some content to the second
period to benefit from partial deterrence.
In Figure 1.4 we present the monopolist’s profit function for some values of δ and
β (d is fixed). The left panel shows how the profit function changes as δ decreases,
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Figure 1.4: The monopolist’s total profit for different values of δ and β.
(a) δ = 1 when β = 0.9 and d = 0.02 (b) δ = 1 when β = 0.6 and d = 0.02
(c) δ = 0.8 when β = 0.9 and d = 0.02 (d) δ = 0.8 when β = 0.6 and d = 0.02
(e) δ = 0.5 when β = 0.9 and d = 0.02 (f) δ = 0.5 when β = 0.6 and d = 0.02
(g) δ = 0.1 when β = 0.9 and d = 0.02 (h) δ = 0.1 when β = 0.6 and d = 0.02
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for a small degradation cost (β = 0.9), while the left one shows how it changes when
the degradation cost is higher (β = 0.6). The first thing we notice is that when β is
lower, the range of γ2 under which piracy is accommodated is higher (and the range
of deterrence is lower). On the one hand, a rise in β makes piracy less attractive
from consumers’ perspective facilitating deterrence. However, on the other side, it
also reduces competition and increases the monopolist’s total profit which give to it
fewer incentives to deter piracy in the first place.
Second, when δ is low (δ = 0.1), the monopolist has incentives to release “all-
at-once” in the first period when the degradation cost is higher in comparison with
a lower degradation cost. This result is because, with a high degradation, the
monopolist faces weaker competition from piracy in a single period, which makes it
easier to deter and to get higher profits in the first period.
1.8 Conclusions
Online piracy has become popular by satisfying the public’s demands for fast, cheap,
and easy-to-access entertainment. Since it started, it has been a contentious issue
and, year after year, it gets more clever and elusive.
Making the pirated version harder to find and more legally risky to consume has
shown to be most effective way to reduce piracy, although its final effect is of little
significance.
We present a model in which the private firm is the one that by changing its
business model changes consumers’ incentives towards buying the original product.
We showed that, in the absence of piracy, the product availability in each period
does not affect the firm’s profit. The monopolist might either release everything at
the beginning, everything at the end, or any combination thereof, and its profit is
independent of the way in which content is released.
However, in the presence of piracy, the way the monopolist releases its product
does affect its profit. Even in the case where there is no “positive effect” from the
demand side, the firm can reduce the adverse effect of piracy by changing the timing
it makes its product available to consumers. Then, on top of prices, the monopolist
has another instrument to fight against piracy, that is the releasing strategy. This
optimal strategy gives the monopolist the possibility of increasing its total profit. In
equilibrium, the firm is always better off releasing positive but asymmetric shares
of its product in both periods.
Finally, we show that, if there exist a low discount factor, the strategy of releasing
“all-at-once” might be the best one, even when it is never the best approach in the
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case with no discount factor. The idea is that the monopolist needs to release a
minimum share in the second period to make it profitable and, when the discount
factor is low, the future profits might not compensate the losses of reducing the
value of the product today.
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Chapter 2
Shill bidding in common value
auctions with discrete information
2.1 Introduction
In auction literature the strategy of cheating by placing anonymous bids on the
sellers behalf to artificially drive up the prices of the auctioned item is known as
Shill bidding. Shill bidding occurs in second-price auctions like English and Vickrey
auctions where the seller, or his agent, pretends to push up the price the winner
pays without the consent of the auctioneer. The key element for getting benefits of
cheating is the anonymity of the virtual bidder, the seller.
Our aim in this paper is to build a simple model of shill bidding in an English
pure-common value auction. We choose this environment to show, in the one hand,
how the seller updates his shill bid as the auction goes on. In the other hand, we
show how this bid updating process affects the legitimate bidders’ perception of the
common value of the object. We find that, even in the extreme case where bidders
are fully myopic, the seller might be worse off doing shill bidding.
When shill bidding is used in a private value context, the goal of the seller is to
place a bid in between the second and the first highest bid in order to increase the
price the winner pays. Nonetheless, when placing a bid the seller does not know if
this bid is in fact in between the two highest bids. On the contrary, in common value
auction, even when the seller does not find profitable to submit a bid higher than
the legitimate second highest bid, his participation change the bidders’ perception
of the common value of the object which may result in a higher selling price.
Moreover, in static auctions, shill bidding is a one-shot decision for the seller: at
the beginning of the auction he has to decide if he submits a shill bid or not based
on the expected gain he get in each of both cases. However, in dynamic auctions
29
the seller is able to update his optimal shill bid as the auction goes along. This
“flexibility effect” makes us think the strategy of shill bidding as a dynamic reserve
price which should give the seller at least the same profits as in the static case.
In our model, given that bidders are fully myopic, they interpret the seller’s
behavior as private information coming from a legitimate bidder and they update
their beliefs about the common value of the object, that might result in bidding more
aggressively than in an auction without this strategy. For this to happen, the seller
must send a high signal. This is not an issue when the seller can decide to drop out
at any price: the seller will be active until two remaining bidders are in the auction
and he will decide to drop out immediately or to wait a bit longer depending on the
actual price of the object. This is almost always the case when bidders’ valuations
come from a continuous distribution and drop out prices are accepted at any time
during the auction.
However, when bidders’ valuation come from a discrete distribution and the
participants are only able to drop out at particular announced prices, the seller faces
a higher cost of being active in the auction at higher prices: the future announced
price could be to late for him, and he could find himself a winner with a high
probability.
Our model shows how this discreteness affects the seller’s expected gain of shill
bidding. In the one hand, he wants to send the highest possible signal to buyers.
In the other hand, being active in the auction (even at very low prices) does never
reduce to zero the probability of wining his own object. The seller might be worse
off doing shill bidding since the probability of ties in a discrete case increase the
probability of winning the object which, in turn, reduces the expected gain of par-
ticipating in the auction. Then, when the number of signals and possible drop out
prices is small, the seller might be better off refraining from participating in the
auction. This is the case when his valuation is sufficiently low in comparison with
bidders’ valuation or when the number of legitimate bidders is sufficiently high.
The intuition of this result is that, for a given seller’s valuation and a number
of legitimate bidders, a small number of signals (and drop out prices) increases the
probability of ties and the seller’s expected probability of finding himself a winner,
for any given price. Then, the decision of dropping out at a low price can be very
costly for the seller’s perspective such that he finds that the best option is to stay out
of the auction. This cost is reduced as the number of remaining bidders in a certain
stage increases (the expected probability of wining the object is reduced), and/or as
the seller’s valuation is closer to the legitimate bidders’ valuation (the cost of wining
the object is also reduced). However, the shill bid has an upper bound above which
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it is never profitable whatever the number of remaining bidders or participants in
the auction.
Finally, we show that, similarly to an optimal reserve price, the optimal shill
bidding strategy is not immune to the number of participants in the auction and
that if the number of bidders is sufficiently high then the seller is always better off
refraining from participating.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2.2 we survey the relevant literature.
We present the formal model of common values, the payoffs and the strategies, and
the timing of the game in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4 we show how the auction
works in absence of shill bidding, while in Section 2.5 we present the model with
shill bidding and the main results. Finally, we conclude in Section 2.6 and in Section
2.7 with some final remarks and conclusions.
2.2 Literature Review
Even though the term “shill bidding” became recently popular with the spread of
online auction, the concept exists since long time ago. The book written by Cassady
(1967) had a major influence among auction theorists. He describes how real-life
auctions work and this topic appears in various chapters of this book, even when
he does not use this specific term. He defines a “puffer” as a “person who, without
having any intention to purchase, is employed by the seller at an auction to raise
the price by fictitious bids, ... while he himself is secured from risk by a secret
understanding with the seller that he shall not be bound by his bids”.
More recently, Lamy (2009) showed that the possibility of shill bidding changes
the ranking of auctions stated in the linkage principle introduced by Milgrom and
Weber (1982). He shows that when the seller is not able to commit to not partici-
pate in the auction the linkage principle does not hold. The second price auction’s
performance is strictly deteriorated by the shill bidding activity and rational bid-
ders but, on the contrary, the first price auction is immune to shill bidding. He gets
that, under certain assumptions, the shill bidding effect can outweigh the benefits
of conveying information. However, if bidders are not aware of this cheating, the
seller is always better off submitting a shill bid.
Vincent (1995) had previously presented a mechanism with a similar motivation
to the one in Lamy’s paper. He found that in a common value auction a seller with
a random reservation value can increase her ex ante expected profits by following
a policy of secret reserve price compared to an auction in which the reserve price
is announced. The idea is that the announcement of a reserve price may have
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an inhibiting effect on bidders’ participation in a given auction discouraging some
bidders from participating. The consequence is that a sale could not be made even
though the aggregate information would imply that a transaction should occur.
Thus, in different ways, both Vincent’s and Lamy’s papers studied the effects of
shill bidding in sealed bid second price auctions and they conclude that the seller is
always better off doing shill bidding if bidders are not aware of it. The intuition is
quite simple: placing a bid in the gap in between the reserve price and the lowest
legitimate bid, the seller can increase his expected payoff.1 This is possible either
because shill bidding is not penalized or because, even being penalized, the seller
can place any bid without being detected. 2 In static auctions, Vincent’s secret
reserve price is equivalent to the concept of shill bidding in Lamy’s paper. Anyway,
in dynamic auctions, these concepts are not equivalent any more.
Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004) were the only ones, to the best of our
knowledge, that used an ascending auction to study the effects of shill bidding.
However, given the nature of the model they used, the flexibility effect does not
appear. They consider the effect of shill bidding in a common value auction using a
two signal model. Given there exist a reserve price that is in between both signals,
the seller’s strategy of shill bidding is, again, a one-shot decision.
Our contribution in this paper is to fill a gap that we think is missing in the
literature. In the one hand, we consider shill bidding in a setting where bidders’
private information comes from a discrete distribution of signals. In the other hand,
we use a three signal model with no reserve price (absolute auction) in order to
understand the dynamics on the seller’s incentives to shill bid in an English auction.
2.3 The Model
In this section we first lay out the basic model of pure common value auction, we
describe a number of conditions on the model that are useful for the subsequent anal-
ysis, and then we present the equilibrium bidding strategies and expected revenue
formulas for the standard auction without and with shill bidding, respectively.
We consider the following pure common value auction model. There are n risk
neutral bidders in an English auction for a single object. There is a common valu-
ation for the object and each bidder has partial information or an estimate about
1Although Lamy also tried to analyzed the ascending auction, he only gave the intuition that,
given the flexibility effect, the seller’s expected gain in a second price auction serves as a lower
bound of the seller’s profits in the dynamic case.
2In a fully rational world, a common value auction with shill bidding cannot be better than an
auction with commitment from the seller’s point of view. For more details about this statement
see Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004), and Lamy (2009).
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the common value. Let si, ∀i = 1, ..., l, be the private signal of bidder i. We assume
that si can take three different values, si ∈ {s1, s2, s3}, which are equally probable
and equally distanced between each other such that s1 < s2 < s3.3 The signals also
have the feature that the lowest and the highest signal are equal to the lower and to
the upper bound of the signal distribution [s, s], respectively. Summing up, we have







This information is commonly known by all the players in the game, the bidders
and the seller.








where n is the number of legitimate bidders in the auction. Notice that there are
no efficiency issues in pure common value auctions as all bidders place equal value
on the item.4
The seller’s value is v0 = 0, and it does not affect the bidders’ valuation. Also,
there is not reserve price (we will see later how the results of the model change when
the seller can set an optimal reserve price).
2.3.1 The Auction
The English auction takes place in the following way. First, the auctioneer sets the
price at zero and gradually raises it. As it is an open auction, the price is observed
by everyone. Bidders signal their willingness to buy by raising a hand, holding up a
sign. This action of every bidder is witnessed by all, so at any time the set of active
bidders is commonly known. Bidders, who are symmetric, might drop out at any
time, but once they do this they cannot reenter the auction at a higher price. If the
auction ends with two or more bidders dropping out at the same price (i.e., there is
a tie) the item is allocated at random, the winner pays the last drop-out price, and
the seller receives this amount (there is not commission fee to the auctioneer).
If there is only one bidder in the auction the object is not sold in that auction.
2.3.2 Bidders’ strategies
The common value of the object, V , is unknown (ex-ante) and belongs in the interval
[s, s]. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium of an ascending auction in which
3We will also call s1, s2, and s3 as the low, medium, and high signal, respectively.
4Efficiency becomes an issue if the seller decides to set an optimal reserve price.
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each bidder plays his weakly dominant strategy: they drop out when they are just
indifferent about finding themselves a winner or not.
Given the discreteness of our model, each signal identifies an optimal drop-out
price. Furthermore, regardless those prices, they are identical for any bidder who
receives the same signal. Thus, we can identified ex-ante three stages in the auction
where: 1) bidders with s1 drop out, 2) bidders with s2 drop out, and 3) bidders with
s3 drop out.5
The first drop out is at a price equal to the signal of the lowest bidder(s) since
that would be the actual value of the object if all bidders had that signal. At that
price, several things can happen. First, if all bidders drop out at that price, the
winner is chosen at random among all of them. Second, if all bidders drop out at
that price but one, that remaining bidder is the winner of the auction. In both
previous cases the winner pays the same drop-out price. Finally, if there are more
than one remaining bidder at the end of that stage, the auction goes on up to the
next stage of the game and the new drop-out price is updated with the information
recently acquired.
Let j1 be the number of bidders who are competing in the first stage of the
auction, j2 be the number of bidders who are competing in the second stage of the
auction, and j3 is the number of bidders who are competing in the third stage of
the auction. Notice that j1 is not the number of bidder who have a signal equal to
s1, but the number of bidders who have a signal at least equal to s1. Given that
there is not reserve price that inhibits players to participate in the auction, we get
l = j1 ≥ j2 ≥ j3, where l is the number of participants in the auction.











s1 if si = s1
[s1 (j1 − j2) + s2j2] if si = s2
[s1 (j1 − j2) + s2 (j2 − j3) + s3j3] if si = s3
which is our discrete three-signals form of the symmetric equilibrium strategies in
an English auction.67
5Notice that the value of the signals are ex-ante commonly known reducing our problem to
estimating the expected number of bidder who drop out at each stage of the auction.
6See Krishna (2009) for more details.
7This is an undominanted strategy because an unilateral deviation gives the seller the same
utility. As an example, assume that all but one bidder drop out in the first stage of the game
and the remaining bidder decides to continue active in the auction even when he also received the
lowest signal. Then, the remaining bidder wins the object and he pays exactly the value of the
lowest signal, his valuation. If he had played the undominated strategy describe above, he would




Notice that bidders’ strategies depends on l, the number of participants, but
their common valuation depend on n, the number of legitimate bidders and their
signals. This difference, in addition with Assumption 2.1, is what can make shill
bidding profitable to the seller in our model.
Assumption 2.1. Bidders are “myopic” in the sense that they put zero probability
that a fake bidder is participating in the auction.
Bidders do observe the number of participants in the auction, l , and they always
believe that l = n. In other words, they put zero probability on the event that a
fake bidder is participating in the auction. The seller’s participation does not only
distort the bidders’ strategy because there is one more bidder, but also because this
bidder is sending a fake signal that might affect the perception of the real common
value of the object.8 We will come back to this issue in Section 4, up to now what
is important is to have in mind that l is equal to n if only legitimate bidders are
bidding in the auction, and l = n+ 1 otherwise.
In order to set an example of how this optimal bidding strategy works, imagine
an auction where the first drop-out price is at p1 = s1, without loss of generality.
If at the end of this stage there are at least two remaining bidders, in other words
if j2 ≥ 2, it means that the signals of those remaining bidders should be either s2
or s3. Then, if the next highest bidder has a signal equal to s2, the next drop-
out price is at p2 = 1/l [s1 (j1 − j2) + s2j2], which is the price at which a bidder
with the medium signal is indifferent about finding himself a winner or not. If
j3 ≥ 2, there are also bidders who have the highest signal and they compete for the




[s1 (j1 − j2) + s2 (j2 − j3) + s3j3]. In any case, if at the end of the first or
the second stage there is only one remaining bidder in the auction, that remaining
bidder is the winner of the object and he pays a price strictly lower than his perceived
valuation (it is the only case in which the winner can get some information rent).
If at the end of the first stage the next highest bidder has a signal equal to s3,
then no bidder drops out at the second stage of the game and the next drop-out price
is at p3 = 1/l [s1 (j1 − j2) + s3j3], given that j2 = j3. Furthermore, it is also the final
price of the object given that s3 is the highest possible signal and j2 = j3 = l − j1.
We use a simple example to show that this is the bidders’ optimal strategy in
the symmetric equilibrium. Suppose there are four bidders in the auction, si ∈
{1, 2, 3} ∀i = 1, ..., 4, and the signals of each bidder are S = {1, 2, 2, 3}. The weakly
his valuation. In both cases, the seller ends up with zero surplus. Given that we are interested in
symmetric equilibrium, we assume that players use this undominated strategy.
8Notice that the common value only depends on the legitimate bidders’ signals.
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dominant strategy says that bidders with the lowest signal should drop out at p1 = 1.
The remaining bidders take this information and use it to update the new drop-out
price which is equal to p2 = 74 . From that price on there would be only one remaining
bidder in the auction who wins the object at a price p2.
Suppose now that the bidder who has the lowest signal wants to bid as a bidder
with a medium signal. Then, given he does not know the other bidders’ signals but
he observe no one drops out p1 = 1, two things can happen. First, if the highest
bidder does not drop out at the second drop-out price (which is the case in our
example), then it means that our bidder does not win the object at p2 = 2 and his
payoff is the same as if he had dropped out at a price p1 (but in that case p2 would
have been equal to 7
4
). Second, if he finds himself the winner at a price p2 = 2 (it
would be the case if S = {1, 2, 2, 2} and he is the random winning bidder), then he
pays a price higher than the common value of the object v = 7
4
, and he ends up
loosing 1
4
. Thus, the strategy calls for each bidder to continue until the price is such
that if he were to win the object at that price he would just break even.
It is important to notice that when the lowest bidder drops out, he knows the
other bidder’s signals are at least as high as his own signal. This means that when
he quits he knows that the value of the object is at least the price at which he
drops out. So the question is, why does he drop out when he knows the value of the
object is weakly higher? This situation occurs because the bidder is avoiding what
is commonly known as the winner’s curse. The idea behind this strategy is that the
relevant thing to bidder i is not the expected value of the object, but its expected
value conditional on him winning it. Something similar happens to the bidder who
wins the object. If he wins the object he knows that all the other signals were below
his own signal and, to avoid paying more for the object and regret after this, he
must adjust the value of the object on him winning it.
2.3.3 Seller’s strategy
The seller has a value v0 = 0. The aim of the seller is to sell this object at the higher
price, however, he knows that auctioning the object the winner bidder will pay the
second highest price (given there is not optimal reserve price).
The seller is not allowed to bid on his own object. However, because he wants
to make the informational rent as small as possible, he might have incentives to
enter the auction pretending to be a legitimate bidder with the aim to push the
price the winner pays. This practice is known as shill bidding and it is forbidden by
the auctioneer because it forces legitimate bidders to pay more than they should or
more than the true market value of the object.
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There are two countervailing incentives the seller faces when he decides to shill
bid. In the one hand, there exists the price effect, given that the shill bid might
change the price of the object by being the second highest bid. This effect is present
in whatever kind of auction the object is being sold. However, this price effect has
a particular component in interdependent values auction (where the common value
auction is an special case). The shill bid might also change the bidders’ perception
of the common value of the object. We call this effect the perception effect and it is
an important effect in our model. Comparing the common values case with a simple
private values model (Izmalkov, 2004), and under regular conditions, the seller has
an extra incentive to stay in the auction until only one legitimate bidder remains,
because the more the seller stays active, the higher the perception effect is.
In the other hand, if the seller decides to shill bid he faces the risk of finding
himself the winner which is, of course, bad news for him. We call this effect the
probability effect. Note that this probability effect also includes the probability of
ties, that under the assumption of discrete signals, cannot be disregarded.
Following Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004) we suppose the auctioneer does
not have the technology to make shill bidding difficult to sellers, but this strategy
is penalized. Therefore, we assume that when the seller participates in the auction
he bids just like a legitimate bidder would bid in that situation, otherwise he is
identified with certainty and penalized.9 The seller also knows the number of active
bidders n before entering the auction.10
Conditional on being in the auction, the seller has two countervailing incentives.
On the one hand, he will want to send a high signal in order to increase the perception
of the common value of the object and, consequently, the final price the winner pays.
But on the other hand, we wants to bid as low as possible in order to not win the
auction.
Before the auction starts, the seller decides to enter the auction and to shill bid
with probability µ ∈ [0, 1], which means:
9If shill bidding was not penalized, the seller’s optimal strategy would be to bid right below the
level other legitimate bidders would do. We supposed that if some participant drops out in between
two optimal drop-out prices, he is perceived as a bidder with the lowest possible signal. However,
this assumption is not enough to guarantee the seller would bid as a legitimate bidder because
after observing this drop out it might be too late for the bidders to revise their strategies affecting
truthful reporting. Then, we also assume that when observing such drop out, and assuming this
bidder has the lowest possible signal, the auctioneer updates the last optimal drop out price and
he starts again raising the price from that last updated price.
10This assumption can be though as if the seller is in the room where the object is going to be






µ = 1 if the seller finds profitable the strategy of shill bidding
µ = 0 if the seller does not find profitable the strategy of shill bidding
µ ∈ (0, 1) if the seller is indifferent between shill bidding or not
If he decides to refrain from participating in the auction, then it takes place
normally with n bidders competing for the object. If the seller decides to participate
in the auction, at any bidder’s drop-out price the seller updates his optimal strategy
which is translated into an optimal stopping time.
Assumption 2.2. The seller is an “advantage bidder” meaning that he has the
possibility to drop out at a certain stage once he observed how many bidders have
already dropped out at that stage.
Even when Assumption 2.2 is not reliable, it is useful for practical purposes: it
help us to show the dynamics on the seller’s decision using the minimum amount of
signals. Given that Assumption 2.2 does not change the bidders’ optimal strategy,
then the seller’s revenue of this game is an upper bound on the seller’s revenue when
all the participants simultaneously decide whether to drop out at a given stage or
to continue active in the following stage of the game.
2.3.4 Timing of the game
We present the game in four stages, from zero to three. However, inside these stages
there exist sequential decisions (given Assumption 2.2). We call “players” to both
kind of participants in this auction, the bidders and the seller. The timing is as
follows:
• Stage 0: the seller is the only player who has to make an strategic decision.
He observes the number of legitimate bidders in the auction, n, and he decides
to enter in the auction to shill bid with probability µ, or to stay out with
probability (1− µ). If the seller decides to stay out of the auction, the auction
starts with no shill bidder. The bidders don’t have to make any strategic
decision. They will enter in the auction as long as their value, that ex ante
is their own signal, is higher than the reserve price. In view of the fact that
there is not reserve price and that the lowest signal is equal to one, all bidders
interested in participating in the auction enter it.
• Stage 1: once the auction starts, the price rises until it reaches a value equal
to the lowest signal, s1. Here, all the bidders with the the lowest signal drop
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out.11 If the seller decided to enter the auction with some probability, after
observing how many bidders remain active for the second stage, j2, he decides
to also drop out at this stage or to continue to the second stage of the game. In
case there is only one remaining player at the end of this stage, the remaining
player is the winner of the object, he pays the drop-out price, and the game
is over. If there are more than one remaining player, the auction continues to
the second stage.
• Stage 2: all bidders with a medium signal drop out. The price at which this
occur is ex-ante unknown but we know that if we are in this stage of the game
the price should be higher than s1 and at most equal to s2, more specifically it






. If the seller is active after the bidders
with a medium signal drop out, he observes how many bidders remain active
to the third stage, j3, and he decides if he drops out immediately or if he
continues to the last stage of the game. In case there is only one remaining
player at the end of this stage, the remaining player is the winner of the object,
he pays the drop-out price, and the game is over. If there are more than one
remaining player the auction continues to the third stage.
• Stage 3: all j2 bidders and the seller (if he is active) drop out. The price






At every stage of the auction game there are a positive probability of ties that
cannot be disregarded. If this is the case, the item is allocated at random between
all tied bidders who have the same probability of winning the object. Figure 2.1
sum up the stages of this game.
11The first drop-out price is equal to the lowest signal because no bidder drops out before that
stage.
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Figure 2.1: Timing of the game
2.4 Standard auction without shill bidding
Consider an English auction with n ≥ 2 legitimate bidders. Bidders are symmetric
and they play their weakly dominant strategy. The winner pay to the auctioneer the
last drop-out price. In order to simplify the analysis we suppose that there is not
commission fee (c) the seller must pay to the auctioneer. If it were the case that the
winner was tied with other bidders, the second highest valuation would be equal to
the first highest valuation and there would be no information rent for the winner.
Assumption 2.3. The lower bound of the private information distribution (signal
distribution), s, is weakly higher than the value of the seller, v0. In other words,
v0 = 0 ≤ s.
We also use the following assumptions,
Assumption 2.4. The value of the seller (v0) does not affect the bidders’ valuation.
Lemma 2.1. When n = 2, the second highest valuation is equal to the second highest
signal.
Proof. With only two bidders in the auction, when the second highest bidder drops
out he does not have any information from previous drop-out prices. It means that
his best strategy is to drop out when the price is equal to his own signal given that
his signal is how much he values the object conditional on him winning it.
The technical issue we face is that, given the nature of the problem, in a common
value auction the second highest valuation, i.e. the price, is equal to the second
highest signal only when n = 2. For n > 2, the second highest valuation is affected
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by the observed signals of bidders who drop out before the second highest bidder’s
drop-out price. When n = 2 we can focus on calculating the second order statistic
of the signals that is equivalent to the second-order statistic of bidders’ valuation.
However, if n > 2 this shortcut is no more valid given that the second-order statistic
of bidders’ valuation depends on the information collected during the auction.
In continuous case the ex-ante estimation of the second order statistic of bidders’
valuation is easily handled. The second highest bidder with signal sn−1 is willing to
pay anything up to his expected value conditional on him winning the object but
being just tied with the winner at the same signal. The issue is that, ex ante, the
second highest bidder does not see the other n − 2 opponents’ bids, so we need to
estimate those signals using the conditional distribution on them being below sn−1.12
In the discrete case the estimation of the second order statistic of bidders’ valu-
ation is more complicated given that we cannot disregard the probability of ties. In
order to calculate the expected second highest valuation we build a mechanism to
get the outcomes of the extensive-form game. We present it in Lemma 2.2.
Lemma 2.2. The expected second highest valuation of the English auction with
n ≥ 2 legitimate bidders, that it is also the seller’s expected gain when he refrains
from participating, is given by










































where f (x) = (x−1)
2
(s− s) + s, ji is the number of bidders which are active at
stage i (in other words, is the number of remaining bidders at the end of stage i−1),
and j0 = j1 = n.
Proof. We calculate the expected second highest valuation in the extensive-form



















[1 + ji (3− i)] + βi+1
}
∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
where
12In the case of uniform distribution in an interval [0, 1], the estimate of those signals is 1
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sn−1,







n if i ≤ 1
2 if i > 1
First, notice that there exist as many βi as number of signals in the auction.
The sum of the β′is estimate the different final prices times the frequency of these
prices in the auction. In particular, the function f(·) calculates the different final
prices, given the history of the game.13 The binomial coefficient and the expression
on square brackets estimate the frequency of each of those prices.14 Finally, βi+1
captures the continuation payoffs if the auction reaches stage i but it does not end
in stage i. The sum over ji goes from 2 onwards because is the minimum number
of bidders needed in that stage to be played. If there are less than two players, that
stage of the game is never reached and the continuation payoff is zero. Moreover,
the sum goes up to ji−1 because the number of competing bidders cannot exceed
the number of remaining bidders in the previous stage, ji−1.15
Once we get β1, β2, and β3, we sum up all of them and we divide the sum by the
number of total possible cases of the extensive game: for n bidders, all the possible
combinations of 3 signals among them are equal to 3n, and we get






There are two important things to say about Equation 2.1. The first one is that
the second highest valuation is increasing in the number of bidders given that our
distribution is Increasing Failure Rate (IFR). The second one is that it converges to
the mean of the distribution, given the pure-common value assumption. We show
both effects in Example 2.1.
Example 2.1. Consider an English auction where the value of the seller is v0 = 0,
and the values for the three possible signals are {1, 2, 3}. The seller’s expected gain
13By default, the value of signals are given by the natural numbers without zero. Then, if we
have three signals their values are 1, 2 and 3. The function f (i) scales the price for different signal
distributions.
14Inside the square brackets, the number 1 represents the case where all remaining bidders drop
out at stage i, and ji (3− i) represents the number of cases where all remaining bidders except one
drop out at that stage.
15In the first stage the sum goes from n to n showing that at the first stage all player are active.
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in the auction with no shill bidding and with n bidders is equal to the expected
second highest valuation given by Equation 2.1. The expected gain is increasing in
the number of bidders and converges to the media of the distribution, 2.
Figure 2.2: Seller’s expected gain when he refrains from participating
Now we got the expected gain of the seller when he refrains from participating
in the auction and we need to compare it with the expected gain shill bidding. We
find the seller’s optimal strategy and its expected payoff in the following Section.
2.5 Standard auction with shill bidding
Suppose now that the seller is able to enter the auction and to shill bid in order to
increase the perception of the common value of the object and the second highest
valuation. Would it be profitable for him? Given that the seller is not able to
observe bidders’ signals, he must update at each step of the auction if it is profitable
for him to continue or to stop.
As previously mentioned, there are two effects that shill bidding can produce:
1. The probability effect. This effect reflects the risk the seller faces of finding
himself a winner when he decides to enter the auction and shill bid.
2. The price effect. The shill bid could change the price of the object by being
the second highest bid (private value effect), but also by changing the bidders’
perception of the common value of the object (perception effect).
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We will show that the price effect, in equilibrium, cannot be negative (otherwise
the seller is not behaving optimally). The probability effect is a seller’s cost and,
in absolute terms, it is always non-positive and it is exacerbated by the price effect
(they are not independent effects).16Notice that even when the seller decides to drop
out immediately after the last drop-out price (coming from a legitimate bidder), the
seller might be able to increase the price of the object changing the second highest
drop-out price through the perception effect. Can the seller do better? It depends
on the last drop-out price, on the potential effect on the final price and on the
probability of finding himself a winner when he submits that shill bid.
Given this game is a sequential game with finite horizon, we can solve it back-
wards. However, in the last stage of the game there is no strategic decision for any
player: if the last stage is reached, all the legitimate bidders will drop out at that
stage and, given that the seller should behave as a real bidder, if he is active in the
auction he will also drop out at that stage. Then, we should start solving the game
in the second stage of the auction, when bidders with a medium signal drop out.
At that moment, the seller has to decide if he drop out at the end of the second
stage or if he continues up to the last stage of the game. It is easy to see that this
decision of dropping out at a given stage is relevant if and only if there is at least one
remaining legitimate bidder at the end of that stage, otherwise the seller is always
better of dropping out at the given stage because if he continues to the following
stage he finds himself a winner with certainty.
2.5.1 Second stage of the auction
Suppose that the seller is still active in the second stage of this game (where the
bidders with a medium signal drop out). The seller has to decide if he also drops
out at this stage or if he continues up to the last stage. Without loss of generality,
suppose that if the seller drops out at stage 2, the final price of the object is equal
to X2. If the seller decides to continue in the auction, the price of the object would
be X2 + ϕj3 , where ϕj3 is the increment the seller produce in the final price of the
object after he decide he will be active at the last stage of the game.17 But the seller
16Imagine the situation where the seller decides to be more aggressive in the auction and he
continues active one more stage. In that case, he increases the perception of the common value of
the object and the second highest valuation, but he also has more chances of finding himself the
winner.
17The parameter ϕj3 can take two values in this setting. If there is only one remaining bidder
at the end of the second stage, then ϕj3=1 =
2
n+1
(s3 − s2). In the case there are more than one
remaining bidder in the auction, ϕj3>1 =
1
n+1
(s3 − s2). The difference comes from the fact that
when there is only one remaining bidder in the auction, the decision of continuing in the auction
raise the price not only because of the marginal effect the seller produces in the final price of the
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receives this price as long as he does not find himself the winner, and this happen
with probability j3
j3+1
, where j3 is the number of bidders at the last stage (or the
number of remaining bidders at the end of the second stage). If the seller is still







expected gain of the seller of staying up to the second stage of the auction (rather
than remaining active at the third stage) is given by
E (gain)s
∗
2 = X2 − (X2 + ϕj3)
j3
j3 + 1
which is always negative.
Lemma 2.3. It is never a best response for the seller to bid as a bidder with the
highest signal when v0 ≤ s.
Proof. Suppose the seller and more than one bidder are still active at the second
stage (where the price is equal to the medium signal), j3 ≥ 2. In this case, if the







is the sum of signals of bidders who are not active in the third stage of the auction.
However, if he continue in the auction bidding as a bidder with the highest signal,




, but he has 1
j3+1
of chances of








expected gain of bidding as a bidder with the medium signal instead of the higher







(s− s) (j3 + 1) +
∑
s 6=j3
(j3 + 1) (n+ 1)
that is always positive.
Now, suppose that at the second stage there is only one remaining bidder, j3 = 1.
Using the same logic expressed above, if the seller bids as a bidder with the highest







. But if he drops out at the




for sure. The expected gain of the seller of









object, but also because of the marginal effect the remaining bidder also produces on it. In the
latter case, if the seller does not continue in the auction, the object is sold at a lower price and
the winner enjoys a positive information rent. If the seller decides to continue in the auction, the
seller appropriates this rent as long as he does not find himself the winner.
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that is also always positive. So, to bid as a bidder with the higher signal is never a
best response.
Finally, suppose that by the second stage all bidders drop out. The best response
for the seller is to also drop at this stage (if he continue in the auction he wins the








Summing up, in any possible case when v0 ≤ s, bidding as a bidder with the
highest signal is never a best response for the seller.
This result is aligned with Lamy’s result (2009) where he shows that in an static
auction (second price auction) there exist an upper bound of the shill bidding activity
above which it is never optimal to shill bid. At the end of the second stage of the
game, the seller knows that if he does not drop out immediately he will be tied with
the highest bidder in the third stage of the game.
Once we showed that the seller does not find profitable to bid as a bidder with
the highest signal we can simplify the general model. Once the shill bidder decides
to enter the auction, the strategic decision is either to drop out at the first stage or
at the second stage of the game.
2.5.2 First stage of the auction
We know from the previous analysis that, conditional on entering the auction, the
seller’s optimal decision is either to bid as a bidder with the lowest signal or to bid
as a bidder with the medium one. A priori, if he sends the lowest signal he would
be minimizing the probability of finding himself the winner but also he would be
sending a signal that reduces the expected price of the object compared to the case
of staying out of the auction. Then, given Assumption 2.2, the seller can decide at
the end of first stage to drop out immediately at that stage or to continue active up
to the second stage. We will see that the seller’s decision to either drop out at the
first or at the second stage of the auction depends on the total number of legitimate
bidders, on the number of remaining bidders in the first stage (j2), and on the signal
distribution.
Lemma 2.4. The seller’s expected profit of dropping out at the first stage of the auc-
tion, rather than at the second one, is increasing in n but decreasing in j2. Moreover,
this expected profit increases if the signal distribution is sufficiently narrow or far
from v0.
Proof. The seller’s expected gain of dropping out in the second stage when j2 = 1
is given by 3
4
(X1 + ϕj2=1), where X1 would be the price if the seller dropped out at
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the first stage (X1 = s), and ϕj2=1 =
2
n+1
(s2 − s1). But if the seller drops out at the
first stage of the auction, he receives s with probability 1. Then, the net expected
gain of dropping out at the first stage when there is only one remaining bidder in






4 (1 + n)
(2.2)
This function is monotone and increasing in n (but with decreasing marginal ef-
fects). Also, this function might take positive or negative values or both (for different
values of n) depending on the the signal distribution. We can easily check that the
seller will find incentive to drop out at the first stage if and only if s (4 + n) ≥ 3s.



















, and X2 is the price if the seller dropped out at stage 1 when








+ s1. The expression in bracket keys reflects the seller’s
incentives of dropping out in the first stage when j2 remaining bidders have the
medium signal and all of them drop out at the second stage of the auction. This
case only happens once out of 2j2 possible combination of remaining signals (s2 and
s3) among j2 remaining bidders. In the rest of the cases the seller loses ϕj2>1 that
is the negative effect the seller produces in the perception of the common value of






j (j2 + 1) (s− s) + s− j2s+ 2ns
2(j2+1) (n+ 1) (j2 + 1)
(2.3)
The result of this Lemma is quite intuitive. First, as n increases (ceteris paribus),
the incentive to bid up to the second stage is reduced given that the effect a shill
bid produces on bidders’ valuations (and drop-out prices) is lower. Second, as j2
increases, the incentives to bid up to the second stage increases given that, for a
given number of bidders, the probability of finding himself a winner in the second
stage is lower. Finally, the signal distribution affects the extra gains the seller can
obtain if he decides to bid more aggressively. For a given n, j2, and s, as s increases
the strategy of being active at the second stage is more profitable than before given
47
Figure 2.3: The seller’s incentives in the first stage of the auction
(a) j2 = 1 when si ∈
{
0, 12 , 1
}
(b) j2 = 1 when si ∈ {1, 2, 3}
(c) j2 = 2 when si ∈
{
0, 12 , 1
}
(d) j2 = 2 when si ∈ {1, 2, 3}
that the seller’s effect on the price is higher and the expected price is far from his
own valuation (we find the opposite effect if we fix s and we reduce s).
In Figure 2.3 we can observe the incentives the seller faces in the first stage of
the auction for different values of n, j2, and for different signal distributions. In the
left side we observe that it is always profitable for the seller to bid as a bidder with
a medium signal (s2 = 12) if there is at least one remaining bidder in the first stage.
As n increases, the seller’ s expected gain is still positive but it is reduced given that
his signal has less effect on the final price.
In the right side we observe that different values for n and j2 not only affect the
profitability of the action in the first stage but also it changes the seller’s optimal
strategy. Similarly to the previous example, the incentives of bidding the medium
signal (s2 = 2) increase as j2 increases. However, at a given n, different values of j2
change the seller’s action at the end of the first stage. For example, when n = 6 the
seller is better off dropping out in the first stage of the auction if j2 = 1, but he is
worse off if j2 = 2 (in the previous example the seller is always worse off dropping
out in the first stage for any value of n and j2).
Summarizing the results of Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.4, we get the following
result:
Proposition 2.1. The net expected gain of doing shill bidding in an English auction,
with n bidders and 3 signals, is given by
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So µ = 1 if this expression is positive, and µ = 0 otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix.
The seller’s participation influences the expected gain of participation in several
ways. First, the shill bid acts as a dynamic reserve price. When s is sufficiently low
(closer to the seller’s valuation), the seller has more incentives to enter the auction
and to submit a shill bid because the price in absence of shill bidding is closer to
his own valuation (as we showed in Figure 2.3). A similar effect has the decrease of
s because it also reduces the expected price when he refrains from participating in
the auction. In both cases, it increases the incentives to participate in the auction
because finding himself the winner is less costly.
Second, the seller’s participation does not only influences the final price of the
object by increasing the expected second highest drop-out price, but also it influences
the bidder’s perception of the common value of the object. Compared to a simple
auction with private values, the seller has more incentives to bid more aggressive
in the auction because doing this he is sending a higher signal that moves upwards
bidders’ drop-out prices. However, this “perception effect” is limited. When n = 2
this effect does not exist because the second drop-out price is equal to the second
highest valuation. This effect not only appears when n ≥ 3, but it is maximum
when n is low and it vanishes when n sufficiently high. The seller’s signal has a
higher effect when the number of bidders is low (but higher than two).
Third, given the nature of our model, when signals are discrete the seller always
has a positive probability of finding himself a winner. As the auction goes on, the
seller faces a tradeoff between increasing the price (either by increasing the second
highest drop-out price itself or by increasing the price through the perception effect)
and decreasing the cost given by the probability of winning the object. We can
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Figure 2.4: Expected gain of shill bidding for different signal distribution
(a) For si ∈
{
0, 12 , 1
}
(b) For si ∈ {1, 2, 3}
notice that, at a given stage, the probability effect decreases as long as the number
of legitimate bidders increases.
The natural question is weather the price effect is higher or lower than the prob-
ability effect, and the answer is that it depends mainly on the signals distribution.
In Figure 2.4 we can observe that shill bidding is never optimal for the seller if
si ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the gains of being active in the auction does not compensate the
losses of finding himself the winner and it is mainly because the expected price of
the object in absence of participation is sufficiently high with respect to his own
valuation.
In the other hand, in the same Figure we see that participation could be profitable






. In this occasion, the
seller has more incentives to participate in the auction when there is not a reserve
price. The expected price of the object when he refrains from participating is too
close to his own valuation that makes the event of winning the object not too costly.
Notice that shill bidding in not always profitable when the signal distribution is
close to the seller’s valuation. In our example, when the number of legitimate bidders
is higher than four the seller prefers to stay out of the auction. This result resembles
the effect of an optimal reserve price: in a model with interdependent values the
optimal reserve price does depend on the number of bidders and it is decreasing in
it. When the distribution of signals is far from the seller’s own valuation, it could
be the case that the seller is better off staying out of the auction for any number of
bidders.
Corollary 2.1. If the number of legitimate bidder is sufficiently high, even if they
are fully myopic, the seller is always better off refraining from participating if buyers’
signals are discrete.
This result also holds for a higher number of signals in the auction, the important
key is that signals should be discrete in order to not make the probability effect equal
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to zero. It is also valid for other bidder’s value function, provided that the single
crossing condition and symmetry holds.
2.6 Final Remarks
The findings in this paper could be extended in several ways. We discuss some of
those extension and how the main result would change in those situations.
2.6.1 More signals
In case the number of signals increases the algebra of the model become more cum-
bersome but the message of this papers is not compromised: as the number of signals
is higher, the probability of ties is reduced and also the intervals among bids which
give the seller more flexibility in his bid. Thus, the strategy of shill bidding is more
attractive from the seller’s perspective.
Suppose the extreme case where the signal distribution is continuous. Izmalkov
(2004) showed that the seller does not have incentive to drop out before the second
highest bidder drops out. The explanation is that when there are more than two
remaining bidders in the auction, the seller finds profitable to stay active in the
auction because, in the one hand, if he waits a bit more he is able to send a higher
signal and, in the other hand, he has no risk of finding himself the winner given that
the probability that all remaining bidders drop out before him at the same price is
zero.
In this case, the seller could be indifferent between entering or not in the auction
but he cannot be never worse off doing shill bidding given that he can always make
the probability effect equal to zero.
Example 2.2. Suppose that si is uniformly distributed in the interval [1, 3], and
v0 = 0. The seller’s expected gain of not participating in the auction with two
legitimate bidders is equal to 5/3 ≈ 1.666. The seller’s expected gain of doing shill
bidding is equal to 1201/710 ≈ 1.668. Then, the seller is slightly better entering
the auction when bidders are fully myopic. However, the incentives are very low
because the seller will find profitable to compete with the highest bidder only when
the second highest bidder drops out at a price lower than 6/5. If the price is higher
than 6/5, the seller does not have incentives to compete with the remaining bidder in
the auction because the cost of finding himself a winner is too high compared to the
gains of increasing the second price. The expected gain of getting some information
rent from the winner is not so attractive compared to the current price. Also, the
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probability that the second signal is below 6/5 is low and this is why, ex ante, the
profitability of doing shill bidding is small (with high probability the seller drops
out immediately after the second highest bidder’s drop-out price changing nothing
in the auction).
2.6.2 Optimal reserve price
As we mentioned before, the strategy of shill bidding can be seen as a strategy of
setting an optimal dynamic reserve price. In the one hand, they present a similar
effect: both are less important as the number of bidders increases. In the other
hand, they are different in the way that shill bidding induces more participation
than an auction with an optimal reserve price but is more “risky” when signals are
discrete.
We are not extending this idea more than this comment, but it is important to
notice that in this model in which signals are discrete, there could be cases where it
is profitable to set an optimal reserve price but the strategy of shill bidding makes
the seller worse off.
Example 2.3. Suppose a modified version of an auction with an optimal reserve
price. There are two legitimate bidders that receive a private signal such that
si ∈ {1, 2, 3}, both are equally probable, and v0 = 0. The number of participant is
known to everybody.18 The seller sets r = 5
3
.19 Then, the seller induces participation
in eight out of nine possible distribution of signals and he keeps the object in the only
case where both legitimate bidders receive the lowest signal. The seller’s expected
gain is given by 47
27
= 1.740 that is strictly higher than the expected gain with no
reserve price, 14/9 = 1.555. From the seller’s perspective it would be optimal to set
a reserve price although it is not optimal to shill bid (his payoff is 41/27 = 1.519).
The profitability of setting an optimal reserve price in this example is that it
increases the expected selling price at a lower cost given that the probability of ties
is zero and it reduces the probability effect that a shill bidder faces when he decides
to participate in the auction. Then, even when the seller shill bids optimally facing
myopic bidders, he can be worse off compared to using an optimal reserve price.
18This assumption is not made without loss of generality. The idea of making the number of
participants known in this example is to facilitate the participation of bidders who has a private
signal above the reserve value and to well define their ex ante valuation conditional on them winning
the object.






In private value auctions, increasing the second highest bid is the only way shill
bidding could have some effect on the final price of the object. On the contrary,
in common value auction, even when the seller does not find profitable to submit a
bid higher than the second highest bid, his participation change bidders’ perception
of the common value of the object which may result in a higher selling price. One
would be tempted to think that in a common value environment the strategy of
shill bidding should be more profitable than in the private values case. However, we
showed that, even when bidders are myopic, the seller might be better off refraining
from participating.
Our contribution was extended to explain this strategy in detail, when the object
is sold in an English Auction and the bidders’ private information is drawn from
a discrete distribution. Conditional on being in the auction, we explained how the
seller update his bid based on the new information he receives as the auction goes on.
We explained how the seller compares the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of
remaining active up the following stage, and how this decision affects the perception
of the common value of the object of legitimate bidders. This decision is affected by
the actual price given the seller compares it with his own private valuation.
We showed that the incentives to shill bid depends on the signal distribution.
We find out that when the number of signals is sufficiently low, even when the seller
is able to increase the final expected price of the object in the auction, the cost
of finding himself a winner might be sufficiently high to make the strategy of shill
bidding not profitable ex-ante. Moreover, we conclude that for a discrete number
of signals in the auction, if the number of participants is sufficiently high the shill




Physician convenience and cesarean
section delivery
Chapter jointly co-authored with Shagun Khare and Alan Acosta
3.1 Introduction
The rates of cesarean section, or c-section, births vary widely across different re-
gions. Figure 3.1 gives an idea of the disparity of rates across the world. There are
stark differences between the developed and emerging world, and Latin America,
for example, has rates far exceeding those recommended by the WHO. Of the ten
countries with the highest c-section rates, six were in Latin America (Gibbons et al.,
2010). Although there are differences across regions, there are also differences within
them. Within the same country or same community, a woman’s chance of getting
a c-section may depend on where she lives and which hospital she goes to. More-
over, studies find that factors like race and socioeconomic status may be associated
with increased or decreased probability of c-sections (Lewis, 2015). These variations
point to the role of nonmedical factors in a woman’s chance of getting a c-section.
Since 1985 the international healthcare community has considered the ideal tar-
get range for the rate for c-sections to be between 10% and 15% (WHO, 2015).
C-section deliveries can be life-saving for both mothers and babies; but at popula-
tion levels, rates higher than 15% are not associated with reductions in maternal and
newborn mortality rates. Those c-sections that are avoidable are costly in monetary
terms, but may also be inimical to the health of the mother and child (Burns et al.,
1995). A c-section birth also limits the possibility of a natural birth for the mother
in the future. Further, in the case where a woman prefers a natural delivery, an
unnecessary c-section would reduce her welfare. The study of nonmedical factors
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that incentivize these c-sections is thus interesting from both a public health and a
welfare perspective.
Among the nonmedical factors that affect c-section rates are the mother’s own
preferences, which may affect their demand. These preferences may be shaped by
factors like personal beliefs, recovery time, differing costs and convenience. On
the other hand, the physician’s preferences may be shaped by differences in pay,
convenience of scheduling, and time spent on each mode of delivery. As the physician
has superior information over the mother, the supplier-induced demand hypothesis
predicts more c-section deliveries than otherwise medically needed. Other than the
mother and physician’s preferences, there is also the institutional environment that
plays a role. Insurance terms, hospital facilities, organization of medical teams may
all affect c-section rates.
In this paper, we look at one aspect of the physician’s incentives — convenience.
We look at whether a woman’s chance of getting a c-section depends on the period of
delivery, i.e. whether it is a working day or not. Setting aside scheduled or elective
c-sections, we still find that convenience matters, but only in private hospitals. In
these hospitals, women who enter labour on a weekend or public holiday are 17%
more likely to have an unscheduled or intrapartum c-section than those who are in
labour on a weekday. There is no significant difference for women admitted to public
hospitals. This difference between private and public hospitals may be attributed
to the institutional environment each one provides.
We also look at the role of women’s preferences in determining the mode of
delivery. As the data comes from a survey of pregnant women, we have the advantage
of information on their professed preferred mode of delivery. We find that preferences
do play a role in delivery mode choice when it comes to scheduled c-sections. Women
who state that they prefer c-sections over natural births have a higher chance of
having a c-section in private hospitals, but it is not the case in public hospitals. We
do not find any influence of preferences over intrapartum c-section rates.
While physicians’ convenience and mothers’ preferences do matter, our research
finds that the institutional environment plays a defining role in defining how much
these matter. In Argentina, in private hospitals the mother is assigned to a single
physician who takes all decisions regarding the birth, whereas in public hospitals a
team of physicians is in charge. Individual physicians’ agency in public hospitals is
thus limited. Changing from a private to a public hospital would reduce a woman’s
chance of undergoing a c-section birth on a working day and it would increase on a
holiday or weekend.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents related lit-
erature on nonmedical factors that affect a woman’s chance of having a c-section.
Section 3.3 talks about the medical system in Buenos Aires, Argentina, which is the
setting of our paper. Details of the survey data are given in Section 3.4. In Sec-
tion 3.5 we present our identification strategy. Finally, our findings are presented in
Section 3.6, and Section 3.8 summarizes.
Figure 3.1: Cesarean sections rates by country
Source: World Health Organization. Infographic: The Huffington Post (2014).
3.2 Literature review
Past research on non-medical factors influencing caesarean-section rates has looked
at physicians’ financial incentives (Gruber et al., 1999; Alexander, 2015; Allin et al.,
2015; Green, 1978; Lo, 2008), physicians’ training (Burns et al., 1995) , as well as at
the use of c-sections as a defensive practice against malpractice suits (Kessler and
McClellan, 1996; Tussing and Wojtowycz, 1997). A fourth explanation is that of
leisure or physician’s convenience, which is the focus of this study. This literature
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can be separated in two. One strand looks at how the hour of the day affects the
probability of having a c-section, while the other looks at the impact of the day
itself. Spetz et al. (2001) find evidence of increased c-sections in evening hours, but
this effect is limited to cases with fee-for-service reimbursement, rather than a fixed
salary. Brown (1996) looks at both time of the day as well as the day of the week.
He finds that the time of the day is a good predictor for c-sections. The probability
of undergoing a c-section in evening hours - especially on a Friday - is higher than
other times of the day. Both Spetz et al. (2001) and Brown (1996) find this effect for
elective as well as unscheduled c-sections but more recently, Lefevre (2014) 1 finds
otherwise. Looking at US deliveries over 2008-2011, she finds that although there
are fewer c-section deliveries in periods around long weekends, this difference can be
explained by the scheduling of planned c-section births. Burns et al. (1995), looking
at the effect of myriad physician level characteristics on c-section rates, find that
convenience does play a role. C-section rates are higher during the daytime, and on
a Friday in their data from Arizona, US. However, the authors do not distinguish
between planned and unplanned c-sections.
This paper also looks at the demand side or maternal request of c-sections.
While no other paper to our knowledge has looked at data on women’s own pro-
fessed preferences, the role of preferences has been studied more indirectly. Grytten
et al. (2013) proxy immigrant mothers’ preferences by the c-section rates in their
countries of origin. They find a substantial role of mothers’ preferences in c-section
rates in Norway over 1970-2005. Furthermore, they find higher rates among those
women who come from countries that stress freedom and choice and self determina-
tion. These preferences play a stronger role in scheduled rather than emergency or
intrapartum c-sections. Others papers find evidence of the parents’ influence in the
choice of birth dates – Lo (2003) looks at increased birth rates on days considered
traditionally ’auspicious’ by Taiwanese, while Dickert-Conlin and Chandra (1999)
and Schulkind and Shapiro (2014) find evidence of a shift of births from the first
week of January to the last week of December in the United States, which they
attribute to increased child tax benefits accruing to births in the previous calendar
year. These papers point to the influence of mothers and more generally that of
parents, in birthing decisions.
1She bases her result on the hypothesis that elective c-sections would then be planned for just
before or just after the long holiday. If indeed the physician cared about his or her leisure, he
would schedule the deliveries further away in time from the long weekend. She finds no evidence
of c-sections that were displaced far enough away in time that they would indicate a physician’s
preference for convenience.
58
Considering the role of institutions in determining c-section rates, Tussing and
Wojtowycz (1994) and Spetz et al. (2001) find, in the context of the US, that group-
model health maintenance organizations (HMO) have lower rates of c-sections than
other insurance plans. Arrieta and García Prado (2016) find a role of capacity
constraints in delivery mode choice in the public sector in Peru. C-sections may be
used as a means to free up beds during high demand periods.
3.3 Background
In Argentina, hospitals are not required to report c-section rates; and there is no of-
ficial estimate for neither public nor private hospitals. Unofficial statistics determine
the rate to be 35%-40% on average, with a much higher rate in private hospitals
(about 50%) than public ones (about 25-30%).2 With the aim to understand the
disparity in the rate of c-sections in public and in private hospitals, it is important
to understand the differences in their structure and in the health care they provide.
3.3.1 Health system in Argentina
The Argentinian health system has two types of hospitals - public ones that are
free for everyone, and private hospitals that charge for services. In practice, private
hospitals are exclusively accessed by those with either private health insurance or
social security cover, both regulated by the Superintendency of Health (SSS), an
independent legal entity which reports to the Ministry of Health.3 The part of the
population that do not have a formal job and cannot afford to pay a private insur-
ance, receive medical attention in public hospitals.4 Public hospitals are financed
by the Ministry of Health and by the money collected from use of services in the
private and in the social security sectors.
3.3.2 Maternity health care
Maternity health care presents many differences in public and private hospitals,
mostly due to their organization before, during and after the baby is born.
2Sources: IOMA (2015), IECS
3The social security sector in Argentina caters to those employed in the formal sector. All
employers and employees in the formal sector are required to make payments to a trust fund
towards this. It covers all workers and their families, as well as those retired. It acts principally
as a paying agent, purchasing health services from the private sector
4A special case is the fund for retired people, the Programa de Atención Médico Integral (PAMI).
It contracts out mainly to private providers, although the demand for health services is also partly
directed at the public sector.
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In public hospitals, there is not a particular physician or midwife that is in charge
of following the prenatal care of a particular woman. On the contrary, all workers
in the maternity department work in teams which means that, in a given shift, a
woman can receive the medical attention of any of the workers in that shift. During
pregnancy, it means that a women might or might not receive the medical attention
of the same physician/midwife, and she cannot choose who is the person in charge
of the follow up examinations. Something similar happen when the birth day arrives
and the woman is admitted into the hospital. During labor, the woman receives care
of the group of physicians and midwives that are working at the time she arrives.
However, if the woman is still in labor when a new shift arrives, the newcomers
continue with her care. Decisions about how to proceed in every case are taken by
the group, and neither physicians nor midwives have any particular interest in being
present at the moment a woman delivers the baby given that they are paid a flat
fee that only depends on the hours they work in their shift.
Private hospitals are organized differently. Women choose a particular physician
or midwife during the prenatal care and these are the ones who take care of the
women not only during the follow up examinations, but also during the delivery.
Women develop a very close relationship with their physicians and midwives, and
they demand to them a personalized care. The advantages of this type of relationship
is that women feel more confident during their pregnancies given that, at the moment
of delivery, they knew the person in charge in advance. This is good either for
women but also for private physicians that can better estimate their workload in the
upcoming months. However, it also raises disadvantages for both: women become
too dependent to their private physician/midwife, and physicians might have periods
of unexpected hard workload being very difficult to organize themselves. Also, it is
more risky for physicians for two reasons: first, because they are paid for delivery
which makes them also more dependent to women, and second, because they are
the main (if not the only) responsible for the outcome.5 .
3.4 Data
The data needed to conduct this analysis was facilitated by the Mother and Child’s
Health Research Department, Institute for Clinical Effectiveness and Health Policy
(IECS) that conducted a prospective cohort study on women’s preferences for the
mode of delivery. The data set comes from survey data and medical records from
5Obstetrics is one of the specialities that faces more malpractice claims, and it accounts for the
most payments. Also, physicians in obstetrics and gynecology are projected to face a claim by the
age of 45 years (Jena et al. (2011)).
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382 pregnant women from September 2010 and December 2011. Enrolled women
were surveyed to obtain their socioeconomic characteristics and their preference for
mode of delivery during the third trimester, particularly if they preferred to give
birth by c-section or vaginal delivery. Women were followed-up until delivery when
their actual mode of delivery was assessed and the data from their medical records
were collected, including the day but not the hour of delivery.
The selection criteria included first-time mothers-to-be (nulliparous women),
aged 18 to 35 years, expecting just one child (singleton pregnancies) and a live
fetus over 32 weeks of gestational age. The sample is restricted to women between
the ages of 18 and 36 years old, in order to maintain a similar age distribution
between the private and public hospitals and to reduce the potential confounding
due to differences in the age of participants across hospital types. In addition,
women with fertility assisted pregnancies, known pre-existing major diseases, with
pregnancy complications, or with a medical indication of elective CS, were excluded
from the sample.
The data was collected in three public hospitals and three private hospitals in
and around the City of Buenos Aires, which typically see more than 2000 deliveries
per year (Mazzoni et al., 2016). The hospitals were chosen based on a convenience
sample of locations where other research studies have been conducted by IECS. Out
of the 382 women surveyed, 182 were admitted to private hospitals and 198 to public
ones.67
The data collected about deliveries is quite detailed. In particular, about c-
section, we know if it was scheduled or not. This gives us a sizeable advantage with
respect to other papers that try to identify the effect of convenience on the mode of
delivery given that we expect all scheduled c-sections to be perform on convenient
days. From the data we can identify two types of c-sections, intrapartum c-sections
(ICS) and elective (or scheduled) c-sections (ECS), and if labor was induced or not.
An elective c-section is the one that is scheduled by the doctor to take place before
labour begins.8 Also, an elective c-section can also be on maternal request and it is
a decision of the physician and the hospital to listen or not the woman’s desire. Far
more frequently, the need for a CS isn’t obvious until a woman is well into labor.
6Two women were removed from the dataset: one because she was untrackable during the follow
up and another one because she had a multiple pregnancy.
7In Argentina, 99% of deliveries occur at either public or private hospitals. The sample is
compatible with the national data from 2010 that says that 55% of the women delivered in public
hospitals, and 44% in private ones (Ministerio de Salud de la Nación. Dirección de Estadísticas e
Información de Salud., 2010).
8There are multiple reason why the physician may peg a woman for the procedure in advance of
her due date such us certain medical conditions, infections, the baby’s health, placenta problems,
etc.
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An intrapartum c-section is the one that happens once labour has begun, and there
are also many reasons for it, such us when labor is stalled, exhaustion or fetal
distress, etc. In many countries, intrapartum c-section are also called "emergency
CS". However, in Argentina the denomination is a bit different and emergency c-
section could happen during labor or not and, if it is the case, it is indicated in our
data.9
3.4.1 Summary statistics
Table 3.1: Type of deliveries by hospital
Public Private Total
All births 197 182 379
Natural births 129 102 231
as % of all births 65,48% 56,04% 60,95%
C-sections 68 80 148
as % of all births 34,52% 43,96% 39,05%
Elective c-sections 9 27 36
as % of all women 4,57% 14,84% 9,50%
Intrapartum c-sections 57 53 110
as % of women in labour 30,32% 34,19% 32,07%
Table 3.1 summarizes the data on types of delivery modes. In our sample, 34.5%
of births in public hospitals and 44% of births in private hospitals were by c-section.
The disparity in c-section rates between public and private hospitals is thus about
10%, but this differential is lower than the unofficial estimate for Argentina (see
Section 3.3). Looking further into scheduled and unscheduled c-sections, we see
that the larger contributor to this difference is the elective c-section rate. Ten
percent of all women in our sample have an elective c-section, but women in private
hospitals have them three times more often than those in public hospitals. The rate
of intrapartum c-sections – c-sections decided once the woman enters labour – is
also higher in private hospitals, but the difference is not as stark. Table C.2 in the
appendix gives us birth data broken down by hospital.
How are the births spread across time? Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of births
by the day of the week. Here we can notice some interesting trends: private hospitals
9For example, if the reason for a c-section is "oligohydramnios and altered doppler", this is an
elective c-section. However, if the doppler is high altered, the elective c-section should be performed
as soon as possible, and this could be considered as an emergency c-section. A case of "eclampsia"
could end up in an emergency c-section either when the woman is in labour or not. In this case, the
emergency c-section could be consider intrapartum c-section or not. Finally, a case of "placental
abruption" in an emergency, but could also happen during labor or not.
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have a peak of deliveries - mainly c-section deliveries - on Mondays and Fridays.
The weekends seem to be relatively calm, with a drop in c-section deliveries. Public
hospitals have a peak on Tuesday, though this peak does not seem be attributed to
c-sections. In the Appendix, Figure C.1 and Figure C.2 present the same graphics
for elective and intrapartum c-sections, respectively.
Figure 3.2: Births by the days of the week
When considering convenience of the physician or their leisure demand, we are
not only interested in weekends and weekdays, but also in holidays over the year.
Table 3.2 gives us an idea of how births are spread by working and nonworking
days.10 Here we see that although two-thirds of the days under consideration were
working days, three-fourths of babies were delivered on these days. In private hos-
pitals in particular, on average, almost double the number of babies were born on a
working day as compared to a nonworking day.
10Our deliveries range from 25 Sep 2010 (Saturday) to 27 Dec 2011 (Tuesday). We begin and and
our calendar with these dates. There are 459 days between these two dates (including both dates).
Of these, we have 66 weekends (132 days). Of weekend days, 6 days were also public holidays.
In addition, 19 public holidays fell on weekdays. Considering public holidays and weekends as
inconvenient days where the doctor’s demand for leisure is high, we have 132+19 = 151 inconvenient
days, and 459− 151 = 308 convenient days.
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Table 3.2: Births by type of day
Weekend +
Working day public holiday Total
Total calendar days 308 151 459
67.10% 32.90% 100.00%
All hospitals
Births 289 90 379
76.25% 23.75% 100.00%
Avg. births per day 0.938 0.596 0.826
Public hospitals
Births 141 56 197
71.57% 28.43% 100.00%
Avg. births per day 0.458 0.371 0.429
Private hospitals
Births 148 34 182
81.32% 18.68% 100.00%
Avg. births per day 0.481 0.225 0.397
We reports the sociodemographic characteristic of women recruited from public
and private hospitals in Table 3.3. It also reports women preferences for the type of
delivery declared during the survey and the actual type of delivery they had.
Women became mothers for the first time at around 26 years old. However, it
changes dramatically between hospitals: while in public hospitals women became
mothers at almost 23 years old, in private hospitals they do it seven years later (29.9
years old).11
In terms of education, more than 90% of women have at least high school edu-
cation, either complete or incomplete. Nevertheless, the asymmetry between public
and private hospitals remains. The majority of women from public hospitals has
high school education (71%), but in private hospitals the level of education is higher,
where 82% of women have tertiary or university level.
Almost each woman in private hospitals is married or in couple (93.4%), in
opposition to public hospitals it is less likely women to be in a stable relationship
(69.9%). In addition, women in private hospitals women are more likely to be
employed and to be covered by health insurance.
11This is compatible with the information at national level in 2006 that says the average age of
new mothers was 28.1 years. However, this average varies by socioeconomic and educational level
of women: 27.2 years old for women who finished college, 23.3 years old for women who completed
secondary education, and 21.3 years old for women who completed primary education (Lupica and
Cogliandro, 2010).
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Table 3.3: Women’s characteristics
All hospitals N mean sd min max
Age 379 26,214 5,375 18 36
Education
Elementary School 378 0.093 0.290 0 1
High School 378 0.458 0.499 0 1
Tertiary/University 378 0.450 0.498 0 1
Married/in couple, or not 378 0.812 0.391 0 1
Working or not 375 0.477 0.500 0 1
Insured or not 379 0.464 0.499 0 1
Prefers CS 367 0.074 0.261 0 1
Had CS 379 0.391 0.489 0 1
Public hospitals
Age 197 22,792 4,104 18 35
Education
Elementary School 196 0.179 0.384 0 1
High School 196 0.714 0.453 0 1
Tertiary/University 196 0.107 0.310 0 1
Married/in couple, or not 196 0.699 0.460 0 1
Working or not 197 0.157 0.365 0 1
Insured or not 197 0.000 0.000 0 0
Prefers CS 197 0.081 0.274 0 1
Had CS 197 0.345 0.477 0 1
Private hospitals
Age 182 29,918 3,946 18 36
Education
Elementary School 182 0.000 0.000 0 0
High School 182 0.181 0.386 0 1
Tertiary/University 182 0.819 0.386 0 1
Married/in couple, or not 182 0.934 0.249 0 1
Working or not 178 0.831 0.375 0 1
Insured or not 182 0.967 0.179 0 1
Prefers CS 170 0.065 0.247 0 1
Had CS 182 0.440 0.498 0 1
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In addition, within the same group of women, it is more likely an older woman in
her twenties to be more educated, to be employed, and to be in a stable relationship.
Also, considering women of different groups (public vs. private), differences are
bigger. As we mentioned above, public health in Argentina is perceived of being of
lower quality than the private one, which results in women of high socioeconomic
status to choose to pay for private health. In addition to this, more educated women
are more likely to be employed and to receive social security that, in most of the
cases, partially cover private health care.
Table 3.4: Preference for mode of delivery and its rate of CS
Preference for VD Rate of CS
Public hospital 91.88% 33.70%
Private hospital 93.53% 40.25%
Total 92.64% 36.76%
Preference for CS Rate of CS
Public hospital 8.12% 43.75%
Private hospital 6.47% 72.73%
Total 7.36% 55.56%
No preference Rate of CS
Public hospital 0% 0%
Private hospital 6.59% 66.67%
Total 6.59% 66.67%
Table 3.4 presents us information on women’s professed preferences. Despite the
different characteristics between the two groups of women, we see that there is no
significant difference between women’s preferences for mode of delivery. Only 8.1%
of women in the public sector and 6.5% of women in the private sector expressed
a preference towards cesarean section (p = 0.55). A minority showed indifference
about the mode of delivery in the private sector (6.6%), but none of women in the
public sector did. The rate of c-section is higher among the group of women who
declare having a preference towards c-section rather than vaginal delivery, in both
public and private hospitals (44% in comparison with 34%, and 73% as opposed to
40%, respectively). This numbers would suggest that women’s preferences are taken
into account when deciding the mode of delivery.
Moreover, among the group of women who are indifferent about the mode of
delivery in the private sector, the rate of c-section is closer to the group of women
who prefer a c-section, suggesting that indifference could play a role of increasing
the rate of c-section in the private sector.
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3.5 Identification strategy
We want to identify the effect of physician’s convenience and mother’s preferences
over the rate of c-sections in public and private hospitals. Given the differences in
how these hospitals are organised, we expect these factors to matter more for private
hospitals. This is because in private hospitals, each doctor individually handles a
birth. This means that they are affected by the timing and duration of delivery, but
also that they can take all decisions regarding the delivery. In public hospitals, on
the other hand, a team of doctors handles each case. No one doctor has complete
say over medical decisions, nor is the burden of delivery only on one doctor.
In studying c-sections, we first make a distinction between those that are sched-
uled ahead of time (elective c-sections), and those that are initiated only once the
woman goes into labour (intrapartum c-sections). We make this distinction because
the extent and manner that nonmedical factors may affect their likelihood are dif-
ferent. We expect that preferences should matter for elective c-sections, but not for
intrapartum ones. Further, since elective c-sections are planned ahead in time, the
date of delivery is more of an outcome of this decision. However, the date of delivery
could be a potential predictor of intrapartum c-section rates.
Looking at elective c-sections, we consider whether the hospital (i.e. whether it
is private or public) and whether the woman herself prefers a c-section over a natural
birth matters. For this we run a probit regression, controlling for women’s age as
well as hospital level characteristics.12 For the latter variable, we include hospital
level fixed effects. This is done to control for possible omitted variables that could
affect c-section rates such as number of beds or number of doctors.
When it comes to intrapartum c-sections, we exclude from our sample those
women who undergo an elective c-section. Doing so, we consider only those that
enter labour. Among these, some go on to have intrapartum c-sections and others,
natural births. Our main question is how a woman’s chance of getting a c-section
once in labour is affected by the hospital, and the day that she has gone into labour.
Our hypothesis is that doctors would like to avoid work on an inconvenient day, and
would want to shift births to days before/after these days – to convenient days. We
follow the same regression as for elective c-sections, but also include convenience
considerations.
To include physician convenience, we consider different specifications of “con-
venient days". To understand these, it is easier to understand what we consider
12We could control for other socio-economic characteristics of the woman, however age was the
only medically important one. Insurance could be important but perfect bifurcation. Trying to be
judicial with our use of controls given sample size.
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as inconvenient days. Convenient days are the complement set of the inconvenient
days, i.e. any day that is not an inconvenient day is a convenient day. In the
first specification, inconvenient days are simply the weekend and public holidays.
The second specification includes these, and also the day before holidays.13 Since
c-sections require follow up care, a doctor may wish to avoid c-sections just before
a day off. The third specification is similar to the second one but excludes the pre-
vious days before holidays falling midweek (e.g. a holiday on a Wednesday doesnot
render Tuesday as inconvenient). In this specification, inconvenient days are week-
ends, holidays and days that are part of ’long weekends’. Table C.1 describes the
different specifications visually.
If physicians want to shift deliveries off inconvenient days, then we should expect
more c-sections on convenient days. However, there are two different effects that
affect the overall rate of c-sections on convenient days. First, there is the effect
of elective c-sections. When a delivery is planned in advanced, then physicians
choose to schedule it on a convenient day.14 Second, the effect of intrapartum c-
sections: physicians might not want to wait for the normal process of labour and they
might decide to proceed with a c-section, even when it was not strictly necessary.
The first effect is an affect that we expect either in public and in private hospitals.
Nevertheless, the second one is an effect that, in case it exists, it should be observable
in private hospitals, where physicians are more interested in speeding up the process.
Our data does not allow us to control for doctor’s characteristics. We do not know
how training or years of experience etc. could determine delivery mode. However,
we can safely exclude physicians financial incentives as a factor. This is because, as
mentioned in Section 3.3, doctors in Argentina are paid for delivery and not for the
type of procedure.
We assume different definitions of convenient days. However, all of them have
in common that in weeks when there is no public holiday, the convenient period is
from Monday to Friday. Physicians may want to avoid working on weekends, so we
might observe more c-sections performed during the convenient period.
In weeks where there is a public holiday, several specifications are taken into
account depending on the day of the week that this public holiday falls. We do
not expect the same effect if a public holiday is observed on a Monday, than if it is
observe in mid-week. The reason is quite simple, a holiday on a Monday creates a
three-day weekend, also called "long weekend", and it induces workers, for instance,
13If a public holiday is a Monday, given the effect of the long weekend, the previous day is defined
on Friday, but if the holiday falls on a Saturday or a Sunday, the previous day is not considered
as an inconvenient day in this specification. See Table C.1 for more details.
14Hospitals are better prepared in case of an emergency, etc.
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to use them to plan city trips with their families. Physicians are not exempt of
it. However, we test different hypothesis and we show that results are robust to
different specifications (see Table C.1 for more details).
In a first specification, convenient days are defined as any day of the week except
Saturday, Sunday and public holidays (conv. day (1)). Our second specification
also considers as a non-convenient day the previous day before holidays, whatever
it is on Monday or in mid-week. If physicians don’t want to put in risk their leisure
time, they would rather avoid intrapartum c-sections the days before public holidays
also, given that performing an intrapartum c-section means that a private physician
has to come back the following day to the hospital to check up the woman and the
baby. If a public holiday is a Monday, given the effect of the long weekend, the
previous day is defined on Friday, and if it is on Saturday or Sunday, the previous
day is not considered (conv. day (2)). Our third specification, considers days before
public holidays only when a public holiday is on Monday and a delivery might
threaten physicians’ leisure time in a long weekend. This specification is similar to
our second one, but the difference is that a public holiday in mid-week does not
make inconvenient the previous day (conv. day (3)).
To assess the effect of physicians’ convenience on the cesarean decision, we ini-
tially run probit regressions of the form
CSi = f(α + β1PrHi + β2convi + β3PrHi × convi + β4pref_cesi
+ β5PrHi × pref_cesi + β6agei + εi) (3.1)
where
CSi is equal to one if individual i received a c-section, and zero otherwise
PrHi is an indicator if individual i delivers in a private hospital
convi is an indicator if individual i delivers on convenient day
pref_cesi is one if the stated preference of individual i is a c-section
agei is the age of individual i at the moment of delivery
We are interested in seeing that given two women with the same pref_cesi,
how the other variables on the RHS affect the outcome CSi. In this regression, the
c-section decision is modelled as a function of the mother’s age and preferences, as
well as the type of hospital and the type of day of delivery. However, as documented
above, the date of delivery is an outcome and not a determinant of elective c-sections
and this regression does not illustrate a causal relationship in this case. Our preferred
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specification is
ECSi = f (α + β1PrHi + β4pref_cesi + β5PrHi × pref_cesi + β6agei + εi)
(3.2)
where ECSi is equal to one if individual i scheduled a c-section, and zero otherwise;15
and
ICSi = f(α + β1PrHi + β2convi + β3PrHi × convi + β4pref_cesi
+ β5PrHi × pref_cesi + β6agei + εi) (3.3)
where IECSi is equal to one if individual i received a c-section, and zero otherwise.
As we already mentioned, the specification for elective c-sections takes into account
the whole sample (given that this decision is taken over the whole sample). Never-
theless, when using the second specification, we take into account only women that
enter labour.
3.6 Results
The results for all c-sections - elective and intrapartum - are given in Table 3.5.
While we can see the hospital (private or public) matters for c-section rates, the day
of delivery only seems to matters in private hospitals.16 Once we include hospital
fixed effects, it is not possible to rely on the coefficient of the variable “Private
hospital” anymore. However, we can still trust in the interactions, and convenience
remains significant for private hospitals. These results, however, do not tell us what
determines the rate of c-sections. This is because the day of delivery (variable
convenient day or ‘Conv. day’) could be either a determinant or an outcome of our
regressand – depending on whether it is an elective or intrapartum c-section. The
next two subsections look at each of these separately, to be able to actually explain
the rates that we observe.
3.6.1 Elective c-sections
An elective c-section is a c-section delivery that has scheduled by the doctor ahead
of time. These are usually done because the mother or the fetus are at risk from a
15In this specification we do not know if the c-section was scheduled by the doctor for a medical
condition or not. However, given the information on women’s preferences we can control for the
women’s will.
16The effect of age is positive and significant when we remove the variable “Age sq.".
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vaginal delivery, such as in the case if the baby is in breech position or if the mother
has previously had a c-section delivery. Nevertheless, the elective c-section can also
be scheduled for the woman’s demand.
Table 3.6 presents the results of the probit estimation of elective c-sections. As
the day of the delivery is now an outcome of the decision to have a c-section, we
have omitted it from our dependent variables. Specification (2) controls for hospital
level fixed effects.17
Table 3.7 gives us the predicted probability of an elective c-section birth for
women going to each hospital. Women in private hospitals have a 2.7 times higher
probability of planned c-section births than women in public hospitals. However,
part of this difference could be explained by the difference of age in the two groups
of women itself. To correct for this, Table 3.8 gives us the probability of an elective
c-section for the average aged woman (26 years old) in each hospital. We see that
the difference is a little narrower: the probability a 26 year old woman undergoes
an elective c-section in a private hospital is double that in a public hospital. Figure
3.3 gives us these probabilities over all the ages of women in the sample. We see
that the probability of having an elective c-section increases unambiguously with
age, but remains consistently higher in private hospitals.
17In this specification, the observations (338) are fewer than in the first specification as in one
of the hospitals, there were no reported elective c-sections (hospid=6, public hospital).
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Table 3.5: C-section: C-section: probit estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ces ces ces ces ces ces
Private hospital (PrH) -0.580* -0.606** -0.652** - - -
(0.317) (0.290) (0.301) (0.436) (0.421) (0.427)
Conv. day -0.0882 -0.108 -0.0866 -0.139 -0.151 -0.123
(0.204) (0.196) (0.202) (0.208) (0.199) (0.202)
PrH x Conv. day 0.651* 0.729** 0.762** 0.750** 0.786** 0.831**
(0.334) (0.311) (0.318) (0.342) (0.315) (0.324)
Prefers CS 0.279 0.278 0.281 0.291 0.289 0.294
(0.328) (0.329) (0.328) (0.335) (0.336) (0.335)
PrH x Prefers CS 0.464 0.428 0.423 0.491 0.449 0.446
(0.541) (0.542) (0.543) (0.552) (0.552) (0.553)
Age + 18 0.0327 0.0321 0.0306 0.0277 0.0263 0.0254
(0.0515) (0.0516) (0.0516) (0.0522) (0.0523) (0.0523)
Age sq. 5.28e-05 0.000108 0.000265 -4.64e-05 6.20e-05 0.000188
(0.00285) (0.00285) (0.00286) (0.00289) (0.00289) (0.00289)
Constant -0.522** -0.513** -0.524*** -1.073*** -1.063*** -1.078***
(0.233) (0.224) (0.225) (0.355) (0.354) (0.353)
Observations 367 367 367 364 364 364
Hospital FE NO NO NO YES YES YES
Convenience definition (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Notes: columns (1), (2) and (3) use different specifications of convenient days defined in the previous Section.
Columns (4), (5) and (6) use the same specification for (1), (2) and (3) but adding fixed effects, respectively.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
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To consider the role of women’s professed preferences of delivery mode, we turn
to Table 3.9. Here for each group of women (sorted along the dimension of prefer-
ences and hospital), we have the expected probability of a c-section. The starkest
difference is for women who prefer c-sections over natural births, and who are ad-
mitted to private hospitals. Their chance of having a scheduled c-section is five
times that of any other class of women. Preferences don’t seem to make much of a
difference in public hospitals. Figure 3.4 presents the same information but at each
given age. We see that the probability of having a planned c-section increases with
age across the board, and that women in private hospitals who prefer c-sections are
much more likely to have them. These women seem to explain most of the difference
of elective c-section rates between public and private hospitals.
To summarize, women in private hospitals are much more likely to have an
elective c-section, especially if they themselves would prefer to have one. These
women then give birth during the week (on a convenient day), mostly on a Friday,
as we can see from Figure C.1 in the Appendix. Those women who have an elective
c-section in public hospitals too give birth on weekdays, but the most likely day of
birth is a Tuesday and not a Friday.
Table 3.6: Elective c-section: probit estimation
VARIABLES (1) (2)




Age sq. 0.008∗ 0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Prefers CS 0.106 0.0412
(0.532) (0.578)





Hospital FE NO YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
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Figure 3.3: Predicted probability of undergoing an elective c-section
Note: this is using the specification without FE, without age sq. Similar if
both used.
Figure 3.4: Predicted probability of undergoing an elective c-section
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Table 3.7: Elective c-section: marginal effects for each hospital
VARIABLES (1) (2)
Public hospital 0.0467∗∗∗ -
(0.0150) (0.0170)
Private hospital 0.140∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
(0.0253) (0.0250)
Observations 367 338
Hospital FE NO YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
Table 3.8: Elective c-section: marginal effects for a 26 y.o. in each hospital
VARIABLES (1) (2)
Public hospital 0.056∗∗∗ -
(0.0191) (0.0211)
Private hospital 0.113∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.0301) (0.0309)
Observations 367 338
Hospital FE NO YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
Table 3.9: Elective c-section: marginal effects
VARIABLES (1) (2)
Prefers natural birth, public hospital 0.0436∗∗∗ -
(0.0151) (0.0170)
Prefers natural birth, private hospital 0.111∗∗∗ 0.0847∗∗∗
(0.0251) (0.0251)
Prefers c-section, public hospital 0.0650 0.0576
(0.0615) (0.0619)
Prefers c-section, private hospital 0.515∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.170)
Observations 367 338
Hospital FE NO YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
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3.6.2 Intrapartum c-sections
As we previously mentioned, an intrapartum c-section is a procedure that takes place
once the woman is on labour. During a first-time birth, a first labor lasts 16 hours on
average, however, this can vary tremendously.18 If a woman arrives in the hospital
once in labour, we assume that no elective c-section was previously scheduled and
so there is no clear indicator that the woman or baby were at risk.19 Then, this
woman might deliver her baby either vaginally or by intrapartum c-section. Figure
C.2 in the Appendix shows us the distribution of delivery modes once in labour
for our sample. Overall, of the women who enter labour, 30.3% go on to have an
intrapartum c-section in public hospitals in our sample, while 34.2% have one in
private hospitals (Table C.3 in the Appendix). So both elective and intrapartum
c-section rates are higher in private hospitals, though the difference for intrapartum
c-sections is not much (the difference is not statistically significant, p = 0.05).
There are many thing we want to test in the model for intrapartum c-sections.
First, we want to know if the professed preferences for delivery mode is taken into
account when women are in labour. Since preferences do not play a role in public
hospitals for elective c-sections, we expect this to be maintained for intrapartum
ones. Further, we expect preferences to matter less for intrapartum c-sections than
for elective c-sections, where the doctor is better disposed to account for nonmedical
factors. Second, we want to know if the rate of intrapartum c-sections is higher for
private hospitals. If the scheduling effect is real for private hospitals, we should
observe a higher rate of intrapartum c-sections only due to the fact that a woman is
delivering in a private hospital. But, most importantly, we should observe a higher
rate of intrapartum c-sections on convenient days: if physicians in private hospitals
can have an effect in the timing of delivery, then we should observe more intrapartum
c-sections before and after inconvenient days. Last, but not least, we want to know
the effect of age on intrapartum c-sections. Age is often cited as a reason for the
rise of c-sections. However, this may be the confounding effect of health issues such
as high blood pressure, diabetes or heart disease, which increase with age. In our
sample, the women have none of these prexisting conditions and so we can truly
isolate the effect of age on the probability of having a c-section.
Table 3.11 presents our probit estimates for the three specification of convenient
days. Results are robust to the different specifications. About the preference for
18Even when the early stage of labour can last for two or three days, most of women may not
even notice that they are in early labour. Then, most of women are admitted into a hospital when
labour is at more advanced levels and delivery is imminent (within 24 hours).
19It may be the case that the woman goes into labour before the schedule elective c-section, but
we assume this is not the case.
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mode of delivery, it seems that it does not change the probability of having an
intrapartum c-section. As we previously mentioned, if this preference is taken into
account, it is more likely to be significant in elective c-sections.
Older women have a higher probability of having an intrapartum c-section, but
its coefficient is not significant. The average predicted probability of undergoing an
intrapartum c-section is 33%, but it is 8% lower for an eighteen-year-old woman and
reaches 8% higher at 35 years old.20 This result suggests that increasing maternal
age is linked with a higher risk of emergency delivery, in a low-risk, first time mother
cohort.21
From Table 3.11 we can also see that delivering in a private hospital on inconve-
nient days has a negative effect on the probability of having an intrapartum c-section.
But most interesting is the result that comes from the coefficient of convenient day
and its interaction with private hospital: while being in labour in a convenient day
does not change the probability of having an intrapartum c-section in a public hos-
pital (in comparison with inconvenient days), it does increase the probability in a
private hospital, in all specifications. Then, what we observe is that even when
the overall rate of intrapartum c-section is similar in public and private hospitals,
its distribution in convenient and inconvenient days is quite different: physicians
in private hospitals shift deliveries off leisure periods, performing more intrapartum
c-sections on convenient days.













Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
20The average discrete effect of age is similar in both, private and public hospitals.
21Similar results were found in Herstad et al. (2015).
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Table 3.11: ICS: Probit estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES ics ics ics ics ics ics ics
Private hospital (PrH) - -0.613* -0.597** -0.639** - - -
(0.365) (0.321) (0.294) (0.306) (0.443) (0.428) (0.434)
Conv. day -0.199 -0.197 -0.158 -0.245 -0.252 -0.186
(0.208) (0.201) (0.204) (0.213) (0.206) (0.209)
PrH x conv. day 0.696** 0.721** 0.743** 0.751** 0.780** 0.777**
(0.342) (0.319) (0.327) (0.350) (0.324) (0.333)
Age 0.055 0.0597 0.0582 0.0570 0.0539 0.0518 0.0508
(0.559) (0.0553) (0.0553) (0.0553) (0.0562) (0.0562) (0.0562)
Age sq. -0.002 -0.00197 -0.00186 -0.00170 -0.00194 -0.00180 -0.00164
(0.003) (0.00310) (0.00310) (0.00311) (0.00314) (0.00314) (0.00315)
Constant -1.190*** -0.593** -0.601*** -0.623*** -1.053*** -1.044*** -1.079***
(0.336) (0.236) (0.229) (0.231) (0.358) (0.358) (0.357)
Observations 340 343 343 343 340 340 340
Hospital FE YES NO NO NO YES YES YES
Notes: columns (2), (3) and (4) use different specifications of convenient days defined in the previous Section. Columns (5),
(6) and (7) use the same specification for (2), (3) and (4) but adding fixed effects, respectively.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
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In Table 3.10 we present the average discrete effects from the Probit Model
with fixed effects (results are similar without fixed effects). When we observe the
effect of convenient and inconvenient days over hospitals, we find some differences.
While in public hospitals the probability of having an intrapartum c-section is a bit
higher on inconvenient days (34% versus 29% on convenient days), this difference is
not statistically significant (p = 0.425). However, for private hospitals we observe
the opposite: there is a higher probability of having an intrapartum c-section in
convenient days (38% against 21% on inconvenient days) and, in this case, the
difference is higher and statistically significant (p = 0.04).
Figure 3.5: Predicted probability of undergoing an intrapartum c-section
However, even when we would expect that convenience plays a key role in in-
creasing the rate of intrapartum c-section in private hospitals on convenient days,
we observe that the effect is on inconvenient days: a woman that delivers in a pri-
vate hospital, conditionally on not being scheduled a c-section, has a significant
lower probability of having an intrapartum c-section on inconvenient days (see Fig-
ure 3.6). This result might be due to the fact that more women schedule c-sections
in private hospitals, which means that, at this stage of pregnancy, only healthier
women are considered.
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Figure 3.6: Predicted probability of undergoing an intrapartum c-section
3.7 Discussion/Further analysis
Even when we know that physicians are not paid differently for the mode of deliv-
ery, hospitals receive higher refunds. Then, we cannot identify if hospitals exert a
pressure on physicians to increase the number of c-sections by sharing with them
the premium they get from performing a c-section rather than a natural delivery.
1. We could control for induction in natural births, this is another instrument to
speed up a birth process.
2. Is selection after elective c-section the only reason why we observe fewer in-
trapartum c-sections in private hospitals on holidays/weekends?
3. How many births displaced from inconvenient to convenient day by elective
c-sections (fewer admissions in private hospitals on weekend bc of peak of
elective c-sections on Friday?)
4. We assume labour has been entered on the same date as date of delivery. This
may not be the case. We should also look at the day before the DOB.
5. We could do a better job at excluding other incentives, especially at hospital
level. However, so far, we couldn’t get more data on how much hospital gains
from each procedure, or revenues in general.
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3.8 Conclusion
From our study of c-sections in Argentina, we find that there are marked differences
in outcomes in the private and public hospitals. A woman’s chance of having a
scheduled or elective c-section birth is much higher (more than double) if she is
admitted to a private than a public hospital. Moreover, if she herself prefers a c-
section over a traditional delivery, she is about five times likely to get one in a private
hospital than a public one. Among those women who enter labour, a third go on to
have an intrapartum c-section in both hospitals. However, behind the similar rates
of intrapartum c-sections is a hidden story.
For intrapartum c-sections, the day of labour is crucial to the outcome in private
hospitals. On a working day, women are twice more likely to give birth with a c-
section than on a weekend or a holiday. In public hospitals, the rates of c-sections do
not vary much by day. Though a woman is much less likely to have a c-section in a
private hospital on a nonworking day; given that there are twice more working days
than nonworking days, and that weekends see fewer women enter labour (perhaps
due to the peak of scheduled c-sections on Fridays), the overall rates of intrapartum
c-sections are similar for private and public hospitals.
Controlling for preexisting health conditions, age has a slightly positive effect on
the chance of having a c-section, but there is a large variance in its impact and as
such we do not find it to be significant.
Lastly, we do not find evidence that delivering in a public hospital, where physi-
cians work in teams, is associated with a lower rate of c-sections in comparison with
private hospitals, where women are followed up by a single physician. What we
do find is that private hospitals schedule more c-sections and also perform more
intrapartum c-sections on convenient days.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1.4
We need to show that as δ decreases, the monopolist’s optimal strategy is to release
a higher share at period one, whenever δ is higher than δ̃. However, when δ is lower
than δ̃ the monopolist’s optimal strategy is to switch and to offer “all-at-once”,
whatever the value of δ in that range. In order to prove this result, we need some
elements first. We assume that t = 2.
Lemma A.1. There exists a threshold, δII ∈ [0, 1], such that, whenever δ > δII , γ
∗∗
2
is a monotone increasing function of δ.
Proof. Given that we cannot represent γ∗∗2 as a function of δ, we use the implicit


















γ∗∗2 is the one that solves this equation. We get the effect of δ on γ
∗∗









The denominator is negative given that it is the sufficient condition for the
existence of a maximum at γ∗∗2 that was already proven. Then, we only need to








1The necessary conditions to implement this theorem are satisfied.
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that is always positive.
Then, γ∗∗2 decreases as δ decreases, provided that γ
∗∗
2 > γ̄2
L, given that from γ̄2L
backwards, piracy is unconditional deterred. When γ∗∗2 = γ̄2
L = 2d
β
we have a corner
solution that is independent of the value of δ. This threshold is given by δII defined
as
δII ≡
(−β2 + β + (β − 2)d) (−β2 + β + 3βd− 2d)
(1− β)(2d− β)2
(A.1)
and it is always between zero and one.
Then, Lemma A.1 show us that, conditional on piracy being conditional deterred,
the monopolist best strategy is to increase the share at period one as the discount
factor decreases.
Next, we show how the optimal strategy changes when we are out of the range
of conditional deterrence, i.e. unconditional deterrence. When this is the case, the
shares of the product are highly differentiated, such that piracy is not a concern
at the second period. We show that the monopolist has a binary decision in this
situation: either it releases “all-at-once” in the first period (γ2 = 0) or it postpones
a fixed positive share (γ̄2L = 2dβ ) to the second one. The decision depends on the
value of the discount factor.
Lemma A.2. There exist a threshold, δIII ∈ [0, 1], such that for values of δ < δIII ,
piracy is unconditional deterred and the monopolist’s optimal strategy is to release
“all-at-once”.


























is convex, and that the optimal solution is not interior. Then, the optimal solution
in this interval is either γ2 = 0 or γ2 = γ̄2L depending on the value of δ. We can
easily show that ΠIII when γ2 = 0 is higher than when γ2 = γ̄2L whenever δ < δIII
defined as
δIII ≡
(1− β)2 + d2β + 2d (1− β)2
(2d− β) (1− β)
(A.4)
83
and δIII is in between zero and one.
From Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2 we know that there is a discrete jump in the
release strategy for different values of δ. However, we still don’t know the value of
γ2 at which this jump takes place. There are two natural candidates for this value,
either at the corner solution, γ2 = γ̄2L, or at the interior solution, γ2 = γ∗∗2 .
We can start comparing the values of δIII and δII . However, given that δIII > δII
we don’t have any additional information about the location of the jump.2 It remains
to compare ΠIIIδ when γ2 is equal to zero, with the optimal value of Π
II
δ when δ = δII




which tell us that the jump is located at the interior solution of the conditional de-
terrence. We define the value of γ2 where the jump takes place as γ̃2. In other words,
there exist a threshold, δ̃, such that for values of δ lower than δ̃, the monopolist is





We can easily check that δ̃ > δII , so any value of γ2 ∈ [0, γ̃2] do never maximize
monopoly profit.
2If it were the case that δIII < δII , we would have a sufficient condition that the jump is located
at γ2 = γ̄2
L.
3ΠIIIδ does not depend on δ when γ2 = 0.
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Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2.1
We make the proof of Proposition 2.1 in three steps.
Step 1: we calculate the seller’s expected income when he participates up to
the first stage in the auction. This case is very similar to the previous one but we
need to take into account one more bidder that always bid with the lowest signal
(who also has a positive probability of finding himself the winner in the case he ties
with n bidders at stage 1),
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We can easily check that bidding the lowest signal is never be a best response for
the seller.1 Conditional on the legitimate price (without shill bidding) being higher
than one, the seller’s entry reduces it. Conditional on the legitimate price being
equal to one, he has some positive probability of finding himself the winner. In both
cases, the seller is worse off.
Step 2: we calculate the seller’s incentives of being active in the second stage
of the auction.
Once we showed that bidding the lowest signal is never a best response for the
seller, we need to find the seller’s optimal decision of being active in the second
stage of the auction. As we show in Equations 2.2 and 2.3, this decision depends
on the number of remaining bidders in the first stage, j2, but also on the signal
distribution. The decision can be summarize in the following function
E (gain)1to2 = 2n×max
[
3s+ 3ns















2j (j2 + 1) (s− s)− s− j2s− s+ j2s− 2ns




1Bidding the lowest signal always decreases the expected price of the object compared to the
case of staying out of the auction.
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Step 3: we calculate the expected gain of the seller when he participates in the
auction.
The only thing we should do is to summarize the previous results together with
Lemma 2.4:
E (gain)P = E (gain)shill − E (gain)no shill
E (gain)P = E (gain)shill (s1) + E (gain)1to2 − E (gain)no shill



















































































That is the equation presented in Proposition 2.1.
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Appendix C
Tables - Chapter 3
Table C.1: Convenient days
(1) (2) (3)
Normal Week
Tuesday x x x
Wednesday x x x
Thursday x x x
Friday x x x
Saturday
Sunday




Tuesday x x x
Wednesday x x x











Thursday x x x
Friday x x x
Saturday
Sunday
Monday x x x
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Figure C.1: Elective c-section births by the days of the week
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Figure C.2: Intrapartum c-section births by the days of the week
The difference between ‘all labour’ and ‘intrapartum c-section births’ are the natural deliveries.
Figure C.3: Predicted probability of undergoing a c-section
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Table C.2: Number and type of deliveries per hospital
Mode of Delivery
Type Name CS VD Total
Public
Hospital Magdalena V. de
Martínez
24 53 77
Hospital Materno Infantil Dr.
Carlos Gianantonio
39 54 93
Hospital Comunal de Tigre 4 22 26
Other public 1 0 1
Subtotal 68 129 197
Private
Hospital Italiano de Buenos Aires 43 46 89




Hospital Británico de Buenos
Aires
20 33 53
Others 0 3 3
Subtotal 80 102 182
At home 0 1 1
Total 148 232 380
Figure C.4: Predicted probability of undergoing a c-section
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Table C.3: Mode of delivery (intrapartum)
Mode of delivery Public hospital Private hospital Total
VD 69.7% 65.8% 233
ICS 30.3% 34.2% 110
Total 188 155 343
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